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I. INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrim-
ination Against Women' represents the universalist 2 response
to women's human rights within the world community through
a document based in liberal political theory. This article, a fem-
inist interpretation of CEDAW, examines the ability of univer-
salism to protect and promote women's human rights, and it
also analyzes the ability of liberal equality to accomplish the
realization of women's human rights. Section I contains a brief
1 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men, 18 Dec. 1979, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 21 (A/34/46), at 193, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/34/180, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1981), reprinted in 19
I.L.M. 33 (1979) [hereinafter CEDAW].
2 For an example of the scholarly promotion of the universalist position, see
Fernando R. Tes6n, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, 25 VA.
J. INT'L L. 869 (1985).
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discussion of the universalism/relativism 3 debate in interna-
tional human rights law. It assigns CEDAW to the universal-
ism side of the debate and depicts CEDAW as a document based
in liberal political theory. Section I also analyzes the differ-
ences between equality and equity as theories for realizing wo-
men's human rights, and discusses the various schools of
feminist legal theory.
Section II examines the position of women's human rights
prior to the implementation of CEDAW. These rights concern
the role of women in the family when family relations were
treated as private associations which should not involve the
legal system. Then, section II discusses CEDAW's place in in-
ternational law. It examines the role of women as defined by
the United Nations, the sponsor of CEDAW. This section situ-
ates CEDAW within the realm of international human rights
law.
Section III is a feminist analysis of CEDAW. The substan-
tive articles of CEDAW are arranged by general subject areas:
political and civil rights; judicial and law enforcement rights;
education and health care; non-governmental discrimination;
customary discrimination; de-criminalization of gender; full de-
velopment of women; de facto4 inequality; and systemic inequal-
ity. This analysis of CEDAW inquires into who is to decide
which steps are necessary for realizing women's human rights,
in addition to the standards utilized for those decisions. This
section highlights the androcentric foundation of CEDAW.
Section IV calls for a greater inclusion of women in deciding
their own fate and an equitable view of women's human rights.
Currently, these rights are advanced as equality rights, mean-
ing the rights of women are protected only to the extent that
they can be defined in terms of the human rights of men. By
3 Universalism is defined as "an ethical theory that the good of all Tmen
should take precedence over that of an individual." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2501 (1976). Relativism is "a
view that theories of what is right and good are relative in that ethical truths
depend upon the individuals and groups holding them so that what is considered
right and good by one person or group may be considered wrong and bad by an-
other." Id. at 1916.
4 De facto "is used to characterize .. . a state of affairs which must be ac-
cepted for all practical purposes, but is illegal or illegitimate." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 416 (6th ed. 1990).
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viewing human rights on an equitable basis, the differences be-
tween men and women can be celebrated without being cause
for discrimination. This may serve to protect cultural varia-
tions, which are at the heart of the relativist position and the
universal right to culture.
A. Universal Human Rights
Universalism is one position in the debate over the role of
culture in the protection and promotion of human rights. In
simple terms, universalists believe that human rights do not
vary in their application, regardless of the country or culture in
which they are applied.5 Atlernatively, relativists believe that
the contents of human rights should be understood through the
cultural setting in question.6 An enlightening recent example
of this debate can be found in the media coverage of the caning
of Michael Fay in Singapore. Fay, an eighteen-year-old Ameri-
can citizen living in Singapore, was sentenced to caning after
being convicted of acts of vandalism. The sentence was dis-
cussed widely in the United States and all over the world.7
Ching-Ning Chu, President of Asian Marketing Consultants,
expressed the relativist view when she said, "Singaporeans
choose the kind of lifestyle that they want .... We should re-
spect the Singaporean law. If I want to live in Singapore, I will
respect the Singapore law."8 Representing the universalist po-
sition, Nadine Strossen, President of the American Civil Liber-
5 Tes6n, supra note 2, at 890.
6 Tes6n, supra note 2, at 870. See generally Adamantia Pollis, Liberal, So-
cialist and Third World Perspectives on Human Rights, in TOWARD A HUMAN
RIGHTs FRAMEwoRK 1 (Adamantia Pollis et al. eds., 1982).
7 See, e.g., American Teenager Appeals on Caning to Singapore President,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, April 20, 1994; Anna Blundy, American Youth Begs for
Mercy from Caning; Flogging Inhumane, Rights Groups Says, THE OTTAWA Crri-
ZEN, April 21, 1994, at A12; Asad Latif, Caning Turned Deftly into Issue of Free-
dom and Basic Rights, THE STRArrs TIMES (Singapore), April 17, 1994, at 8;
Geoffrey Levy, In Singapore, Any Day Now, This 18-Year-Old Will Be Flogged Un-
conscious for Vandalizing Cars. Barbarism? Or Effective Justice in a Country
Which Has Purged its Streets of Crime? So What Are the Lessons for Britain?,
DAILY MAIL (London), March 24, 1994, at 14; Philip Shenon, U.S. Youth in Singa-
pore Loses Appeal on Flogging, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 1994, at A5.
8 Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, April 15, 1994) (transcript on file with
PACE INT'L L. REV.).
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ties Union, referred to the Singaporean practice of caning as
"barbaric and... rejected by civilized society."9
The question of whether to privilege culture or to privilege
universal human rights has been an on-going debate. Its begin-
nings can be found in discussions over nationalism 10 versus uni-
versalism and nationalism versus self-determination. 1  The
debate is complicated by the universal norm of the realization of
cultural rights, expressed in article 22 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. This guarantees that "[e]veryone . . . is
entitled to [the] realization. . . of the ... cultural rights indis-
pensable for his [sic] dignity and the free development of his
[sic] personality." 12 This universal standard places universal-
ists in a position to protect cultural human rights variations so
that the universal right to realize one's own culture is protected.
Proponents of cultural relativism and proponents of universal-
ism used the United Nations Conference on Human Rights in
Vienna in June of 1993 as yet another forum for their on-going
debate.' 3
B. CEDAW as a Liberal Text
In addition to representing universalism, CEDAW repre-
sents the liberal tradition of equality. Liberal political theory is
based on the concepts of "[rationality, individual choice, equal
rights and equal opportunity."' 4 In this model, dominated
groups strive to be granted the same rights enjoyed by the dom-
inant group.' 5 Therefore, rights are defined by the dominant
group and the dominated groups must conform their desires to
these definitions. In the United States, this philosophical base
has led to an attempt to define the medical aspects of pregnancy
as being essentially the same as various medical conditions
9 Id.
10 Nationalism is defined as the "devotion to the interests of a particular na-
tion." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 874 (1981).
11 Self-determination is defined as the "[fIreedom of a people or area to deter-
mine its own political status." Id. at 1176.
12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/
80, at 71 (1948).
13 See, e.g., Lir Teck Ghee, Human Rights After Vienna: End to Gloom?, Bus.
TIMES, July 31, 1993, at 1.
14 Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV. 803,
829 (1990).
15 Id. at 831.
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faced by men.' 6 This comparison is complicated at best and im-
possible at worst. CEDAW promotes this liberal tradition of
equality by defining discrimination against women as the "im-
pair[ment] or nulliflication] of the recognition, enjoyment or ex-
ercise by women, . . . on [the] basis of equality of men and
women, of human rights."' 7
By 1992, 117 countries' were bound by CEDAW. However,
many of these countries practice customs that allegedly violate
the human rights of women.' 9 Therefore, in spite of this wide-
spread commitment to the equality of men and women, cultural
practices such as female genital mutilation, veiling of women,
dowry, and woman battering continue. The claimed rationale
behind these practices is often the biological differences be-
tween men and women. As will be seen, however, these prac-
tices are based actually on cultural constructs of the differences
between the genders. Whether women function openly as the
carriers of tradition, as they do in countries practicing female
genital mutilation and veiling of women; or whether women are
devalued within a society to the extent that practices which
harm them are not zealously outlawed, as is the case with
dowry in India; or whether a practice is so deeply entrenched
within a culture that it is not even recognized as a cultural tra-
dition, as with the case of woman battering in the United
States, women and men are clearly not treated equally. 20 Fur-
16 See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325
(1984-1985).
17 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 1 (emphasis added).
18 KATARINA TOMASEVSKI, WOMEN AND HUMAN RIGHTS 108 (1993).
19 See, e.g., Id. at 117 (signatories to CEDAW include Ghana, Kenya and
Egypt; countries in which female genital mutilation is practiced; and Iraq, Jordan
and Yemen; countries in which the Islamic tradition of purdah is practiced). Pur-
dah is defined as the practice of secluding women from men. THE AMERICAN HERI-
TAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1061 (1981). India and the United
States have signed but not ratified CEDAW. BASIC DoCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND WORLD ORDER 928 (Burns H. Weston, et al. eds., 1990). This is true even
though the practice of dowry leads to the deaths of thousands of women in India
and woman battering in the United States is accepted as a cultural norm. See Jo
L. Southard, Gypsies in the Palace: Relativism, Universalism and Women's
Human Rights (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with PACE INT'L L. REV.).
20 See Edward Broadbent, Getting Rid of Male Bias, in OURS By RIGHT: WO-
MEN'S RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS 10, 10 (Joanna Kerr ed., 1993). "The truth is that
the international community has done precious little to correct these abuses." Id.
[Vol. 8:1
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thermore, liberal equality does not hold much hope for rectify-
ing the disparate treatment of women and men.
C. Equality and Equity
CEDAW, drafted under the auspices of the male-dominated
United Nations,2 1 calls for States Parties to "ensure to women,
on equal terms with men, the right[s]"22 to vote and be eligible
for election; to control their own nationality; to have access to
education, employment and health care; to have full legal ca-
pacity; to have equality in the context of marriage; and to enjoy
other rights "on equal terms with men."23
In article 6, CEDAW calls for the elimination of prostitution
and the trafficking of women, an international problem peculiar
to women.24 However, nowhere does CEDAW mention rape, wo-
man battering, or other forms of gender-based violence; abor-
tion, forced childbirth or female infanticide; or female genital
mutilation, veiling or other forms of abusive cultural or reli-
gious practices. Nevertheless, CEDAW does call for the modifi-
cation of "the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to[wards] achieving the elimination of
prejudices."25 Even though CEDAW serves an important func-
tion in bringing women's human rights center stage in the in-
ternational human rights arena, it continues the androcentric
approach to women's human rights by using a male standard
for determining these rights.
The various schools of feminist legal analysis, including lib-
eral feminism,26 radical feminism, 27 cultural feminism, 28 and
21 Barbara Adams, The UN, World Conferences and Women's Rights, in OURS
BY RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 115, 115.
The U[nited] N[ations] is an arena in which women have raised concerns
and influenced agendas, particularly during the U[nited] N[ations] Decade
for Women, through the CEDAW and with the monitoring of the Forward
Looking Strategies. Yet, it is a male-dominated system, and this influences
processes of decision-making and concepts of participation.
Barbara Adams, The UN, World Conferences and Women's Rights, in OURS BY
RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 115, 115.
22 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 7.
23 CEDAW, supra note 1, passim.
24 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 6.
25 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 5.
26 "Liberal feminism is rooted in the belief that women, as well as men, are
rights-bearing, autonomous human beings." Cain, supra note 14, at 829.
19961
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postmodern feminism,29 have been grappling with the issues of
equality for several years. Liberal feminists assert a theory of
equality based on liberal political theory that urges equal oppor-
tunity for women.30 Because the theory of equality is based on
the priniciple that people in similar situations should be treated
similarly, liberal feminism has been criticized as unable to deal
with situations where men and women are truly not similarly
situated.31 This is true in areas of cultural, societal and biologi-
cal differences. For instance, issues that arise out of pregnancy
do not have a corollary among men.
Radical feminists have responded to liberal feminists by
emphasizing women as an oppressed class.32 When comparing
the situations of men and women, radical feminists highlight
the differences between the genders. They argue that these dif-
ferences are constructed in a way that benefits men and allows
for the continued oppression of women. 33
Like radical feminists, cultural feminists focus on the dif-
ferences between men and women. However, cultural feminists
emphasize the value of these differences.3 4 They contend that
men have defined the qualities of women in a way that devalues
these qualities. 35
Postmodern feminists avoid discussing women as a group.
They recognize that women are often situated differently from
one another.3 6 Therefore, the diversity among women is high-
lighted in this theory.
Feminist theories contain not only differences but common-
alities. It is those commonalities I will focus on to analyze the
international community's conception of and response to wo-
men's issues via CEDAW. To that end, I will "rest[ ] on the fun-
27 "[[Rladical Feminis[m] focus[es] on women as a class, typically as a class
that is dominated by another class known as men." Cain, supra note 14, at 832.
28 Cultural feminism embraces the characteristic differences between men
and women. Cain, supra note 14, at 836.
29 Postmodern feminism supports the gender-based categorizations as being
an inherent part of the social construct. Cain, supra note 14, at 838.
30 Cain, supra note 14, at 829.
31 Cain, supra note 14, at 830-31.
32 Cain, supra note 14, at 832.
33 Cain, supra note 14, at 832-33.
34 Cain, supra note 14, at 835-36.
35 Cain, supra note 14, at 838.
36 Cain, supra note 14, at 839.
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damental notion that [a] wom[a]n's experience is the central
starting point of theory: theory flows from experience in the
world, and then theory refines and modifies that experience."37
It seems clear that the inclusion of women's voices in the inter-
national arena is the first and essential step to the inclusion of
their experiences and concerns. It should be unremarkable that
"[p]eople in power should not be privileged to dictate appropri-
ate ways for disempowered people to give voice to their sense of
hurt and exclusion."38 Rather, the oppressed should be allowed
and encouraged to give voice to their own oppression and to for-
mulate strategies that are appropriate in overcoming that
oppression.
As an expression of women's human rights, CEDAW is most
closely aligned with the liberal feminism, or liberal political,
school of thought. CEDAW calls for an elimination of discrimi-
nation against women so that women may participate "on equal
terms with men, in the political, social, economic and cultural
life of their countries."39 This approach continues to entrench
the male-dominated view of equality. That is, equality is to be
treated like a man. When true differences, biological or cul-
tural, between women and men occur, they must be accounted
for in relation to the male standard. Therefore, article 16 calls
for measures to "ensure, on a basis of equality of men and wo-
men, . . . [tihe same rights to decide freely and responsibly on
the number and spacing of their children."40 Biologically, how-
ever, women and men do not have the same experiences with
pregnancy and childbirth. A woman cannot deny maternity,
she cannot walk away from a pregnancy, and, realistically, she
will bear the greatest responsibility in child rearing. CEDAW
may attempt to legislate equality in these matters, but it cannot
be done. Legislation will not suddenly enable men to get preg-
nant, nor will it allow women to deny that they are pregnant.
37 Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Femi-
nist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 521
(1992).
38 Peter M. Shane, Why Are So Many People So Unhappy? Habits of Thought
and Resistance to Diversity in Legal Education, 75 IowA L. REV. 1033, 1040 n.14
(1990).
39 CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl., para. 7.
40 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 16(e).
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In the area of social or cultural differences, CEDAW calls
for education and employment opportunities that are available
to men to be available to women. 4 ' In article 11, CEDAW calls
for the "support[ I [of] social services to enable parents to com-
bine family obligations with work responsibilities."42 However,
the family obligations of women and men are not equal to begin
with, since women carry the major responsibility of child
rearing.
The problem with CEDAWs view of equality, or any view of
equality, is the standard used to measure such equality. Be-
cause men have been the standard for many years, women must
attempt to fit an androcentrically constructed mold. CEDAW
fails to adequately address the systemic changes that are
needed to protect the human rights of women. CEDAW is, how-
ever, a conventional and customary expression of international
law. A change in the way the international community views
equality will address many of the shortcomings of CEDAW and
will procure the systematic changes necessary to promote the
human rights of women.
Canadian law professor Diana Majury argues for equality
as a strategy, thereby abandoning the search for a universal
meaning to equality.43 Instead, each situation is analyzed to
determine its inherent inequality. The inequality present in
each setting will be different depending on its circumstances.
In certain situations, men and women are similarly situated,
but they are being treated differently. In other situations, men
and women, for biological or social reasons, are not similarly
situated, and the treatment afforded to women further op-
presses them. For example, it further stigmatizes women to say
that they cannot engage in a particular career or educational
program because they may get pregnant. On the other hand,
simply ignoring the fact that women get pregnant is not an ade-
quate response. An equitable accommodation for the pregnant
woman must be created to enable her to receive the same oppor-
tunities that a man receives.
41 CEDAW, supra note 1, at arts. 10-11.
42 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 11(2)(c).
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Many of the human rights that are found in international
law are general in nature. The international community contin-
ues to discuss the meaning of torture, intervention, self-deter-
mination and many other terms. Equality, as outlined in
CEDAW, functions the same way. Each new charge of discrimi-
nation against women must be analyzed within its own context,
resulting in different solutions and in different methods for
achieving those solutions. When equality is viewed as a strat-
egy, the discovery of the true meaning of equality is not part of
the process. Therefore, equality as a strategy, framed by
CEDAW, has the potential to provide the forum in which female
genital mutilation, veiling, dowry, woman battering, and other
gender-specific cultural traditions are analyzed as abuses of wo-
men's human rights.
An analysis of woman-directed cultural practices shows
that women are often situated differently from one another.
However, all of these practices serve the same goal, maintain-
ing the oppression of women as a group. Although there are
differences among feminist legal theorists, all theories recognize
that women's voices are silenced, and that the concept of gender
is not a factor in municipal or international decision-making. 44
In this feminist legal analysis, I am not attempting to apply one
particular strand of feminist legal theory, nor, am I claiming
that there is one "distinctive feminine morality."45 Instead,
feminist theory
signifies an interest (gender as an issue of primary importance); a
focus of attention (women as individuals and as members of
groups); a political agenda (real social, political, economic and cul-
tural equality regardless of gender); a critical stance (an analysis
of "masculinism" and male hierarchical power or "patriarchy"); a
means of reinterpreting and reformulating substantive law so
that it more adequately reflects the experiences of all people; and
an alternative method of practicing, talking about and learning
the law.46
Cultural practices affecting women can be analyzed under
several different universal international human rights stan-
44 Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85
A.J.I.L. 613, 623 (1991).
45 Id. at 616.
46 Id. at 634.
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dards. Female genital mutilation can be identified as torture or
inhuman treatment. Veiling can be seen as a violation of the
freedom of movement and the freedom of religion. It can be ar-
gued that dowry is a violation under any of the treaties that
guarantee men and women the equal right to enter marriage.
Furthermore, the practices resulting from the dowry system vi-
olate any treaty guaranteeing the right to life. Woman bat-
tering is a denial of equal treatment before the law and a
violation of the right to security. However, since all of these
practices deal with the treatment of women in a given culture,
CEDAW will be utilized as a template of women's human rights.
Nonetheless, the analysis applies to any (androcentric) univer-
sal standard that one might use to protect and promote the
human rights of women.
II. PATRIARCHY IS UNIVERSAL
A. Women in International Law Before CEDAW
Although the concept of non-discrimination against women
was included in the United Nations Charter,47 women were con-
sidered objects of international law particularly in relation to
their roles as wives and mothers.48 The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights called for the equality of men and women to
enter into a marriage, to dissolve a marriage, and to be treated
as equals during the marriage. 49 In addition, the Universal
Declaration held that "motherhood . . . [is] entitled to special
care and protection."50 Even though these areas require special
protection, singling them out while ignoring other human rights
for women perpetuates the belief that women's human rights
revolve around the family.51 According to the international
47 U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
48 TOMASEVSKI, supra note 18, at 100.
49 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, at art. 16.
50 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, at art. 25, para. 2.
51 See, e.g., JANICE WOOD WETZEL, THE WORLD OF WOMEN: IN PURSUIT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, 154-55 (1993).
It is believed to be "natural" that women's place is in the home, regardless of
whether or not they are employed. It is assumed that the tasks they are
expected to perform are universal, based on the biological imperatives of
sex. Bearing and rearing children, their most important role, defines their
entire lives. Since it is assumed as well that men control families, it is
deemed just as "natural" that they are the heads of them. In governmental
[Vol. 8:1
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community, marriage and child bearing are the paramount
roles for women. Therefore, it is understandable that interna-
tional law would be loathe to interfere with practices that influ-
ence a woman's marriageability within her culture.
It is not a coincidence that many of the cultural practices
that are required of women, for example, female genital mutila-
tion, purdah, dowry, and woman battering relate to marriage
and are largely ignored by the international community. They
reinforce the idea that a woman's role is to be a "wife." As such,
these practices limit a woman's choices. Little girls are muti-
lated to assure their purity for marriage; young women are
veiled to protect their virtue for marriage; families save their
whole lives for a dowry substantial enough to assure a good
marriage for their daughters; and woman battering must be en-
dured by women in order to stay married. A woman who
chooses not to marry is not even considered. Whether she is a
lesbian, a bisexual, or a heterosexual who simply prefers not to
marry, she is seen as denying the essential role of a woman.
Therefore, a woman who is not married is devalued in her
society.
In addition to viewing women as wives and mothers, inter-
national human rights instruments emphasize that "[tihe fam-
ily is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State."52 Several inter-
national human rights instruments also contain language pro-
policy and law throughout the world, families are called "female-headed"
only when men do not live in them.
Id.
52 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, at art. 16(3). Lan-
guage designating the family as the natural and fundamental group of society ap-
pears in other international documents. See International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at art. 10(1) (1966); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp.
No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6313, at art. 23(1) (1966); African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/rev.5, at art. 18
(1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982) ("The family shall be the natural unit and
basis of society."); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 36
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. LfV/II/.23 rev.2, at art. 17 (1970),
reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970); European Social Charter, opened for signature
Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, at art. 16, Europ. T.S. 35 (entered into force Feb.
26, 1965) ("[Ihe family... is a fundamental unit of society....").
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tecting the privacy of the family from state intervention. 53
Although most of these conventions contain provisions that call
for the equal treatment of men and women within their mar-
riage, special status and protection to the family reinforces the
traditional public/private distinction. This distinction is based
on the fact that the private arena of the family is subject to less
legal restrictions than the public arena.54 As the United States
Supreme Court has noted, marriage is "a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy .... Marriage is... intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way
of life. . . ."55 As in the United States, the international commu-
nity contends that marriage should be governed from a distance
and then governed as little as possible.
The emphasis placed on a woman's role as wife and mother
in international conventions and resolutions confines her to the
family arena. Therefore, she is excluded from the public arena
where she would be judged by her occupation, education and
other similar criteria. Moreover, the international community
53 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, at art. 12
("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his [sic] privacy, family,
home or correspondence . . . ."); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, id., supra note 52, art. 17 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlaw-
ful interference with his [sic] privacy, family, home or correspondence .... "); Afri-
can Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 52, at art. 18 ("[The family]
shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical health and
moral."); American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 52, at art. 11(2) ("No
one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his [sic] private life,
his family, his home .... ."); European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, at art. 8(1)
& (2), 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) ("Everyone has the right
to respect for his [sic] private and family life .... There shall be no interference by
a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society....").
54 See, e.g., Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Pub-
lic /Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARv. HUM. RTs. J.
87, 101 (1993).
At the root of the enshrinement of family in conventional human rights law
lies a convergence of narratives which legitimates a hierarchical ordering of
intimate relations; this convergence is hidden behind the notion that the
family as a social unit is beyond the purview of the state. Love and intimacy
become guards on the borders that place the family unit "beyond justice."
Thus, beyond justice are the distribution of crucial rights and
responsibilities.
Id.
55 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
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calls for the special protection of the family, mandating that the
state remain outside family issues in all but a few instances. As
a result, women's lives, to the extent that they revolve around
the family, remain outside the scope of legal protection, whether
that protection is international or national.
These twin theses-that women's lives revolve around
marriage and child bearing and that families should be shielded
from government intervention as much as possible-have al-
lowed the international community to avoid, to some degree, the
promotion of women's human rights and, to a greater degree,
the enforcement of those rights. Although the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights guarantees to everyone the security of
person,56 the "U[nited] N[ations] Commission on Human
Rights has never seriously looked at the myriad of forms of vio-
lence against women."57 The division between the public and
private world that occurs in individual states has been repli-
cated by the international community. The largest number of
reservations to CEDAW are reservations to article 16, which
calls for the elimination of discrimination in marriage and the
family. Therefore, whether national or international, "[tihe law
just does not reach to the private sphere of the family."58
Other human rights afforded to women by the international
community are based on a male standard.5 9 When rights are
created based on the standard of any dominant group, certain,
often false, assumptions underlie the application of these rights
56 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, at art. 3.
57 Edward Broadbent, Human Rights Conference Challenges Nations to Act at
Last, THE GAZErrE (Montreal), June 11, 1993, at B3.
58 Rebecca Cook, Gaining Redress Within a Human Rights Framework, in
OuRs By RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 13, 13.
r9 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 73.
The organization of society has been developed from the standpoint of men,
what interests them, and is relevant to them. Until recently, it has been
written by, about, and for men who listened to one another. Women have
been systematically excluded, having had no written history, no poetic or
artistic tradition, no share in religious ideas, no political philosophy, nor
representation of society from their perspective. The means available to wo-
men to think about, image, and put into action their experience has been
manufactured for them, not by them. [sic] [Sluch power exists for men sim-
ply because they are a member of a ruling social category, not necessarily
because of any individual characteristic. When they speak, they speak with
the authority of the category, never standing alone as each woman in every
society must do.
WETZEL, supra note 51, at 73.
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to the dominated groups. Catherine MacKinnon, a feminist
legal scholar, makes this argument in reference to the freedom
of speech guaranteed to the citizens of the United States by the
First Amendment. 60 She maintains that freedom of speech as-
sumes that there will be "equal social access to the means of
expression."61 Since social inequality exists between men and
women in the United States, this presumption is untrue. It is
impossible for women to participate in the "free trade [of]
ideas"62 if access to the marketplace is restricted.
In the international context, the "right to life, liberty and
security of the person"63 currently does not include freedom
from woman battering or female genital mutilation. This is be-
cause the content of this right is androcentric in nature. A non-
patriarchal system would recognize that the concept of freedom
from "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment"64 would encom-
pass dowry deaths and female genital mutilation.6 5 Moreover,
in spite of their culture, Middle-Eastern women would have
their freedom of religion protected. Instead, in some of its man-
ifestations, the concept of purdah includes restricting women
from entering mosques. 66 The international protection is pro-
vided to the men who use religion as a basis for their inequita-
ble treatment of women.
In recent decades, the international community has begun
to look at women's human rights more broadly. The Interna-
tional Women's Year began in 1975. However, it became clear
that the problems faced by women required more than a year to
be addressed adequately; therefore, the United Nations Decade
for Women was proclaimed.67 The initial conference in Mexico
City led to the "World Plan of Action," resulting in 90% of the
world's governments instituting some mechanism for promoting
60 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 127, 129 (1987). See U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
61 Id.
62 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
63 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, at art. 3.
64 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, at art. 5.
65 See Edward Broadbent, Getting Rid of Male Bias, in OuRs By RIGHT: WO-
MEN'S RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 10, 11.
66 JEAN SASSON, PRINCESS: A TRUE STORY OF LIFE BEHIND THE VEIL IN SAUDI
ARABIA 65 (1992).
67 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 2.
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women's human rights.68 In 1979, midway through the United
Nations Decade for Women, the United Nations General As-
sembly adopted CEDAW.69 In spite of this apparent rise in con-
sciousness, however, it continued to be men who determined
how to protect women's human rights. Although women make
up 50% of the voters in the world, "they hold less than 8 percent
of the seats in national legislatures."70 Even at the Nairobi
Conference that marked the end of the United Nations Decade
for Women,
[mien, though relatively few in number at the conference, some-
times served as spokesmen for their delegations. Men were also
often involved in negotiating the wording of paragraphs on polit-
ical issues and were highly visible as policy advisers to the women
.... United Nations figures showed that at least fourteen of the
delegations were led by men and that the 2,020 delegates in-
cluded 357 men.71
B. CEDAW's Role in International Law
By 1992, 117 countries ratified CEDAW.72 Nonetheless, to-
day the status of women worldwide remains inferior to that of
men. Although women represent approximately half of the
world's population, they receive one-tenth of the world's income
and own less than one-hundredth of the property throughout
the world. 73 If the unpaid domestic labor of women was in-
cluded in gross national product figures, it would amount to 4
68 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 2-3.
69 CEDAW, supra note 1.
70 Elizabeth Mehren, International Gender Gap Is Wide Open, L.A. TIMES,
April 12, 1985, at 1.
71 U.S. Delegate Protests Conference On Women, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1985, at
1.
In addition, (an American delegate, Alan L. Keyes, who seemed never more
than a few feet from [U.S. Delegation Chairwoman Maureen] Reagan during
debates, took a leading role by demanding points of order. Men on the Egyp-
tian, Syrian, and Palestine Liberation Organization delegations dominated
the proceedings at times and engaged in most debates. Most of the inter-
preters were men, as was the official United Nations legal adviser to the
conference, who was often called on to aid [Conference Chairwoman Mar-
garet] Kenyatta.
Id.
72 ToMASEvsIu, supra note 18, at 108.
73 Alya Baffoun, Feminism and Muslim Fundamentalism: The Tunisian and
Algerian Cases, in IDENTITY POLMCS & WOMEN: CuLTURAL REASSERTIONS AND
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trillion dollars.7 4 There are over 130 million more illiterate wo-
men than men throughout the world, yet there are 80 million
more boys than girls in primary and secondary schools.75 Un-
fortunately, CEDAW does little to change the status of women.
States Parties retained eighty substantive reservations to
CEDAW, more reservations than any other international con-
vention.76 Among those reservations were: eight substantive
reservations to article 2, calling for the end of discrimination
against women; six substantive reservations to article 7, calling
for the elimination of discrimination against women in public
and political life; eleven substantive reservations to article 9,
calling for the equal citizenship rights of women; ten substan-
tive reservations to article 15, calling for the full legal capacity
of women; and seventeen substantive reservations to article 16,
calling for the right of equality in marriage and the family.
77
The practical effect of these reservations "was understood by
the objecting [Sitates [Parties] to be that the reserving [S]tates
[Parties] would only observe those CEDAW norms which they
would have observed anyway, in the absence of [CEDAW]. In
other words, treaty participation did not signify a commitment
to the provisions of the treaty ... "78 These reservations were
allowed in spite of the fact that international law, in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, says that a State Party
"may formulate a reservation [to a treaty] unless ... the reser-
vation is incompatible with the object and purposes of the
treaty."79
In June of 1993, the United Nations Conference on Human
Rights was held in Vienna.80 Much to the surprise of many in
FEMINISMS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 167, 169 (Valentine M. Moghadam ed.,
1994).
74 Mehren, supra note 70, at 1.
75 Mehren, supra note 70, at 1.
76 Joanna Kerr, The Context and the Goal, in OURs By RIGr: WOMEN'S
RiGHTs As HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 3, 5. See also Belinda Clark, The
Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on Discrimination
Against Women, 85 A.J.I.L. 281 (1991).
77 TomAsEvsiu, supra note 18, at 118.
78 Clark, supra note 76, at 317.
79 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, at art. 19 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
80 Joanna Kerr, UN Rights Conference: Women Take Centre Stage, THE OT-
TAWA CITIZEN, June 29, 1993, at All.
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attendance, women were among the most organized and vocal of
the groups present."' As a result, the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action contained a clause stating that women's
human rights are "an inalienable, integral and indivisible part
of universal human rights."8 2 Additionally, it called for an end
to acts of gender-based violence, "including those resulting from
cultural prejudice... [and it stated that] [t]he human rights of
women should form an integral part of the United Nations
human rights activities."83
Universalists proclaim that there are advantages to the
concept of universal human rights standards, such as those rep-
resented by CEDAW and the Vienna Declaration. This is true
particularly if they are general standards that can be accepted
as universal principles. On the other hand, general standards
should not be so vague that they do not provide workable guide-
lines. Currently, the protection that is available is on a univer-
sal or semi-universal regional level. 84 In contrast to relativism,
universalism has strong support in the international commu-
nity, as witnessed by the inclusion in the Vienna Declaration
that "[t]he universal nature of these rights and freedoms is be-
yond question." 5
CEDAW and the Vienna Declaration are universal state-
ments of women's human rights. The United Nations Confer-
81 Id.
Amid the pessimism and confusion that have clouded the discussions at the
United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, there is one
success story to be told: the effective performance of the women. Vienna was
taken by storm by women's human-rights activists at the conference that
ended Friday. After years of preparation, these women managed success-
fully to show the United Nations and official delegates that their govern-
ments have failed to promote and protect the rights of half of humanity.
Women from Iran to Malaysia, from Canada to Chile, from South Africa to
Tunisia came together to expose the huge gender gap in the recognition and
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Id.
82 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23,
at art. I, para. 18(1) (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna
Declaration].
83 Vienna Declaration, id., at art. I, para. 18(2) & (3). See also Coln Boland,
Conference Sends Out Clear Signal on Women's Rights, IRISH TIMES, June 26,
1993, at 7 ("[Tlhe major breakthrough in terms of the U[nited] N[ation]'s interna-
tional declarations was a powerful new section on women's rights.").
84 See generally Southard, supra note 19.
85 Vienna Declaration, supra note 82, at art. I, para. 1(1).
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ence was "[d]eeply concerned by various forms of discrimination
and violence, to which women continue to be exposed all over
the world." 86 Universalism provides a means of enforcement
that can counter-act local patriarchy, but only if the interna-
tional community recognizes the existence of that patriarchy
and its inherent structure in the international realm. If wo-
men's human rights are made truly universal and are promoted
to incorporate the needs and desires of women,87 the theory of
universalism will make it more difficult to ignore women's
human rights or to "postpone" them until other goals are
achieved.88
Of the 117 States Parties to CEDAW, forty-one submitted
substantive reservations.8 9 Nineteen countries submitted res-
ervations relating to dispute resolution, which is expressly per-
mitted by CEDAW, leaving twenty-two reservations to the
substantive policy sections of CEDAW.90 For example, Iraq
filed reservations on article 2 (eliminating discrimination
against women), article 9 (granting women equal rights in citi-
zenship) and article 16 (eliminating discrimination against wo-
8 Vienna Declaration, supra note 82, at pmbl., para. 10 (emphasis in
original).
87 See Carolyn Hannan-Andersson, Integrating, Not Separating, Women in
Development, in OuRs By RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS As HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note
20, at 119, 122.
It is also clear that the concept of human rights is unacceptable because it is
based on male norms and does not take into consideration the needs and
rights of women. The "add women and stir" concept of integration will not
be adequate-there is a need for the transformation to impact on policy and
practice in the mainstream, and for changes of attitudes within agencies to
accommodate this shift of focus. Even those agencies which have a strong
equity focus and a strong focus on human rights have not always recognized
or emphasized women's rights in an integrated manner.
Carolyn Hannan-Andersson, Integrating, Not Separating, Women in Development,
in OuRs By RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS As HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 119, 122.
88 See CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES AND BASES: MAKING FEMINIST
SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITIcs 62 (1989).
Women who have called for more genuine equality between the sexes-in
the movement, in the home-have been told now is not the time, the nation
is too fragile, the enemy is too near. Women must be patient, they must
wait until the nationalist goal is achieved; then relations between men and
women can be addressed. "Not now, later," is advice that rings in the ears of
many nationalist women.
Id. (emphasis in original).
89 TomiSEvsu, supra note 18, at 117.
90 See Clark, supra note 76, at 282.
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men in marriage). Egypt filed reservations on the same three
articles. Jordan filed reservations on articles 9 and 16, as well
as article 15 (granting women equality before the law and full
legal capacity). Malawi and Tunisia have filed reservations to
article 2 and Tunisia has filed reservations to articles 9 and
16.91 With these reservations, the States Parties in question do
"not consider as binding upon [themselves] the provisions of ar-
ticles 2 [and others] as they conflict with Sharia Law based on
Holy Quran and Sunna."92
These reservations violate the stated purpose of CEDAW
"that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set
forth [in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights]." 93 The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that a State
Party may deposit reservations to a treaty it signs, "unless...
the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty."94 In the words of the preamble to CEDAW, the ob-
ject and purpose of the treaty seems to be two-fold: a recognition
that, although the principle of gender equality is included in the
International Covenants on Human Rights, "extensive discrimi-
nation against women continues to exist,"95 and that "[t]he full
and complete development of a country, the welfare of the
world, and the cause of peace require the maximum participa-
tion of women on equal terms with men in all fields."
96
Although article 28 of CEDAW states that "[a] reservation in-
compatible with the object and purpose of CEDAW shall not be
permitted,"97 the reservations noted above are incompatible
with CEDAW's stated object and purpose. 98
Regardless of the number of signatories to CEDAW, or the
validity of the reservations submitted, CEDAW still represents
emerging international customary law. The practice of States
Parties support the finding that non-discrimination against wo-
91 TOMAsEVSKI, supra note 18, at 118.
92 Clark, supra note 76, at 299 quoting Multilateral Treaties Deposited with
the Secretary-General: Status As At 31 December 1989, at 171, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.E/8 (1990).
93 CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl., para. 2.
94 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 79, at art. 2(c).
95 CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl., para. 6.
96 CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl., para. 12.
97 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 28(2).
98 Clark, supra note 76, at 299.
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men is not a norm of international law. However, the so-called
psychological component - opiniojuris - of customary law is ful-
filled by CEDAW. The United Nations Charter affirmed the
"equal rights of men and women"99 and CEDAW is seen as an
amplification of these rights. Additionally, the 1993 Vienna
Declaration, reflecting the consensus of the 170 countries at-
tending the conference, reaffirmed the equality of women and
men.'0 0 It went further than any other treaty or declaration,
except CEDAW, in protecting the rights of women. The Vienna
Declaration promoted universal human rights "regardless of...
cultural systems;"101 protected against "gender-based violence
and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation;" 0 2 "pre-
vented the systematic rape of women in war situations;" 0 3 and
included several other sections relating directly to women's
human rights. 10 4
Reservations aside, CEDAW is second only to the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination 05 in the number of ratifications for an anti-
discrimination treaty. The Convention on the Rights of the
Child 06 was the only human rights treaty ratified in less
time.'0 7 In spite of the reservations, CEDAW represents a legal
and moral commitment by over half of the world's countries to
eliminate gender discrimination. If CEDAW is recognized as a
codification of more general statements contained in the United
Nations Charter and the Vienna Declaration, virtually the en-
tire world is obligated to eliminate discrimination against
women.
99 UN CHARTER pmbl., para. 2.
100 Vienna Declaration, supra note 82, at pmbl., para. 6. See also Chai Kim
Wah, UN World Conference on Human Rights: Basic Issues Left Open, THE STRAITS
TIMES (Singapore), July 4, 1993 at 12.
101 Vienna Declaration, supra note 82, at art. I, para. 5.
102 Vienna Declaration, supra note 82, at art. I, para. 18(2).
103 Vienna Declaration, supra note 82, at art. I, para. 28.
104 Vienna Declaration, supra note 82, at art. II(B)(3), paras. 36-44.
105 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4,
1969).
106 Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Jan. 26, 1990,
G.A. Res. 44J25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989), with an addendum in 29 I.L.M.
1340 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
107 TOMAsEVSKI, supra note 18, at 115.
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At this time, the principle of non-discrimination against
women is not a principle of international customary law. How-
ever, CEDAW is the most viable and far-reaching statement of
women's human rights that currently exists. Since it has the
potential to impact significantly on international law, it is im-
portant to analyze the efficacy of the treaty in promoting and
protecting women's human rights.
C. Women and the United Nations
CEDAW "spells out the meaning of equality and how it can
be achieved. In so doing, the Convention establishes not only
an international bill of rights for women, but also an agenda for
action by countries to guarantee the enjoyment of those
rights." 08 The United Nations Department of Public Informa-
tion reprint of CEDAW notes that "[tihe legal status of women
receives the broadest attention" in CEDAW. 10 9 The other two
major issues covered in CEDAW are the reproductive rights of
women and "the influence of culture and tradition on restricting
women's enjoyment of their fundamental rights." 10
The United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Dis-
crimination against Women [hereinafter the Committee] is
charged with monitoring the implementation of CEDAW."'
However, the Committee does not fare well in the United Na-
tions hierarchy. Article 20 limits the Committee's meeting time
to "normally . . . not more than two weeks annually."112 No
other organization charged with overseeing a United Nations
human rights convention is limited in such a fashion."x3 Claims
by the Committee that its working conditions are substandard
compared to other human rights committees have also been re-
ported."x4 It is clear that it is not only a lack of commitment on
the part of States Parties to CEDAW, but a lack of commitment
108 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Wo-
men at 1, U.N. Sales No. DPI/993 (1990).
109 Id. at 1.
110 Id. at 2.
111 Id. at 3. CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 17.
112 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 20(1).
113 Theodor Meron, Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Prohibition of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, 84 A.J.I.L. 213, 214 (1990).
114 Charlesworth et al., supra note 44, at 624 n.70. The Committee was under-
staffed, under-funded, and lacked the authority to investigate claims of violations.
Therefore, it relied upon information by State Parties to determinate violators.
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on the part of its sponsoring agency, the United Nations, which
results in CEDAW being unable to improve the status of women
internationally.
The United Nations planned to staff 25% of its professional
positions with women by 1982. They were unable to achieve
that goal by 1986. In 1989, the United Nations Children's Fund
had only four women in senior staff positions out of its twenty-
nine positions. This is unfortunate since women are primarily
responsible for child care throughout the world. In 1989, the
Food and Agriculture Organization had fifty-one positions, none
of which were held by women. This is true even though women
are primarily responsible for food production in many areas of
the world. Furthermore, the World Health Organization only
has four women on its staff of forty-two. 115
The Committee is made up of all women members. Besides
this representation, women are "vastly underrepresented on
U[nited] N[ations] human rights bodies."11 6 Nonetheless, the
Economic and Social Council has called upon States Parties to
nominate both men and women to the Committee.11 7 Therefore,
while the United Nations is unable to meet its own goals for
representation of women within the organization-goals that
do not even reflect population realities-there is an attempt to
reduce the representation of women on the Committee. This is
one area where women need to maintain numerical power since
it relates directly to the lives of millions of women.
III. "WHY CAN'T A WoMAN BE MORE LIKE A MAN?"1 1 8-
CEDAW's APPROACH TO QUALITY
Assuming the Committee could function in a manner equal
to other human rights committees within the United Nations,
and assuming States Parties were precluded from making res-
ervations that subvert the purpose of the treaty, would CEDAW
be able to function as a vehicle for achieving "the equal rights of
See Joanna Kerr, The Context and the Goal, in OuRs By RIGHT: WOMEN'S RIGHTS
As HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 3, 5-6.
115 Charlesworth et al., supra note 44, at 623 n.60.
116 Charlesworth et al., supra note 44, at 624.
117 Charlesworth et al., supra note 44, at 624.
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men and women?" 119 In the preamble to CEDAW, reference is
made to earlier United Nations resolutions and conventions,
noting that "States Parties to the International Covenants on
Human Rights have the obligation to ensure the equal right of
men and women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil and
political rights."120 Furthermore, CEDAW recognizes that dis-
crimination against women is not only detrimental to individual
women, but to the development of society as a whole. 121 Pov-
erty, racism, foreign domination and the absence of peace and
security negatively impact women more than men.' 22 In the
preamble, CEDAW mentions the role of women in, and the con-
tribution of women to, the family.123 Therefore, although
CEDAW does not reaffirm the family as the basic unit of society,
it does continue the practice of placing great emphasis on the
importance of relationships between women and their families.
However, CEDAW calls for unspecified changes in the "tradi-
tional role of men as well as the role of women . . . in the
family."124
CEDAW's preamble is a strong statement in support of wo-
men's human rights. It calls for changes in the family and in
societal structures to bring about true equality for women.
CEDAW notes that the accomplishment of other United Nations
goals are diminished in their importance if women are not al-
lowed to participate in the realization of these goals. It touches
on the traditional roles of women and men and notes that these
roles must be open to change. CEDAW addresses underlying
societal norms and unquestioned assumptions in regard to wo-
men and their status in society. It is, however, the articles fol-
lowing the preamble that constitute the substantive parts of
CEDAW, the International Bill of Rights for Women, to which
the parties have agreed.
A. Discrimination Against Women-Article 1
Article 1 of CEDAW states:
119 CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl., para. 1.
120 CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl., para. 3.
121 CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl., para. 7.
122 CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl., paras. 8, 10, 11.
123 CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl., paras. 13 & 14.
124 CEDAW, supra note 1, at pmbl., para. 14.
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[flor the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimi-
nation against women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or pur-
pose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exer-
cise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of
equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
other field. 125
Article 1 guarantees women equal rights to those of men. How-
ever, it is important to ask what standard is used to measure
equality. Since women are the oppressed group, it necessarily
follows that men are the oppressors. The phrase, "recognition,
enjoyment or exercise," indicates that these rights exist for wo-
men. However, access to them is denied. The conclusion, there-
fore, is that women should be allowed access to the rights
enjoyed by men with the male standard applying.
Are women allowed the same political rights as men? Are
they allowed to vote, to run for public office, to exercise free
speech and freedom of assembly, like men? The male standard
ignores several essential societal entrenchments. Since women
are primarily responsible for childcare, 126 who will watch their
children while they vote and run for office? Women are also pri-
marily responsible for feeding their families 127 and doing the
household work. Since they are not compensated for these
tasks, the international community does not consider them to
be work.128 However, who will take responsibility for these
tasks while women run for office and participate in free speech
activities? Since women are not compensated for the work that
they do, or if compensated, they are compensated at a lower
rate than men,1 29 how will they be able to afford to start their
own newspapers and television stations to enable them to par-
ticipate in free speech? Who will pay for the traveling that
needs to be done in order to start new political organizations or
125 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 1.
126 TOMASEvsKI, supra note 18, at 21.
127 Barber Conable, President of the World Bank, quoted in ELISABETH BUMIL-
LER, MAY You BE THE MOTHER OF A HUNDRED SONS: A JOURNEY AMONG THE WO-
MEN OF INDIA 13 (1990).
128 TOMAEVSKI, supra note 18, at 50.
129 BUMILLER, supra note 127. See also TOMASEVSKI, supra note 18, at 55.
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to participate in existing political organizations under the right
to freely assemble?
The obstacles women must overcome to participate in the
political arena often result in lower participation by women,
thus, "proving" that women are not interested in participating
in this arena. However, it is the societal structure which pre-
vents women from participating. Even if women are able to
overcome these obstacles, their participation will be based on a
male standard. Political parties and elections are usually ad-
versarial in nature, a method of interaction associated more
with men than with women. 130 Thus, if a woman attends a
political meeting where she disagrees with a speaker, she must
leap to her feet and challenge that speaker. If she takes the
time to analyze the statement, to consider the ramifications and
to think about a response, the meeting has moved on to a new
topic. No one kept her from speaking; she had her chance. Why
didn't she say something if she disagreed?
In addition to men and women having different methods of
communication, women are reared not to disagree with men.13'
Past barriers placed before women kept them from political par-
ticipation, thereby allowing men to gain experience with polit-
ical participation. Hence, it takes a tremendous act of courage
for women to challenge the views of men since men are familiar
with the political process.
Article 1 provides women with equal access to economic ar-
eas. However, women's traditional workplace is in the home,
therefore, it is neither compensated, nor recognized as work.
Even though CEDAW does not allow for States Parties to estab-
lish laws which limit the work that women can do, CEDAW does
not recognize the significant economic contribution already
made by women. A working man whose wife "does not work" is
freed up to do his job. His wife is raising his children, cleaning
his house, cooking his food and washing his clothes. These are
tasks that would take him away from his work. If a man were
required to pay for this work, the wages his employer would
have to pay him would increase dramatically.
130 DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CON-
VERSATION 150 (1990).
131 Id. at 67.
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The obstacles to social and cultural activities faced by wo-
men may be even more insurmountable. Cultural traditions
and social practices that restrict and oppress women have been
in place for centuries. It will take more than announcing that
these traditions are no longer relevant for both men and women
to relinquish them. Attitudes that are so deeply entrenched
seem self-evident, particularly by those who are not victimized
by them. As a result, the oppression of women, in the name of
culture or tradition, continues to the present.
For example, a 1994 report indicates that the number of
dowry deaths-young brides murdered by their husband's fam-
ily when the bride's family cannot meet increasing dowry de-
mands-are on the rise in India.132 This is in spite of the fact
that the payment of dowry was outlawed in India in 1961.133
Additionally, in May of 1994, a female United States citizen liv-
ing in Iran was convicted of prostitution. She was publicly
flogged and then deported to the United States. 34 Although
the Iranian report of the flogging did not contain details, "ex-
perts said 80 lashes is not uncommon for such a crime."13 5 This
incident occurred a month after Michael Fay was sentenced to
caning in Singapore with all the publicity that ensued. 136 The
International Federation of Obstetricians and Gynecologists is-
sued a report in 1994 which stated that incidents of female gen-
ital mutilation are on the rise in many countries, with 2 million
new mutilations performed annually. 137 This is true even
though women have been mobilized against this practice since
the 1970s. 138 Furthermore, in October, 1994, a judge in Mary-
land sentenced a man to eighteen months in prison for killing
his wife after he found her with another man. The man pled
guilty to manslaughter for this crime. The judge sympathized
132 'Dowry Deaths'Rising in India, THE GAzETE (Montreal), Aug. 25, 1994, at
B1.
133 Alizabeth Newman, For Richer, For Poorer, 'Til Death Do Us Part:' India's
Response to Dowry Deaths, 15 I.L.S.A. J. INT'L L. 109, 115 (1992).
134 Iran Publicly Flogs Prostitute From Texas, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May
6, 1994, at A26.
135 Id.
136 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
137 Carolyn Adolph, Sex Bias Kills, Mutilates Millions of Women: Report, THE
GAZEl-rE (Montreal) Sept. 27, 1994, at Al.
138 Myriam Marquez, A Holy Rite or Brutal Torture? ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH,
Aug. 11, 1994 at 7B.
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with the defendant, saying, "I seriously wonder how many men
married five [or] four years would have [had] the strength to
walk away without inflicting some corporal punishment. " 139
Since corporal punishment is physical and the purpose of pun-
ishment is to correct behavior, the judge's opinion of a husband
and wife relationship is clear: a husband has the right to use
physical means to correct his wife's behavior. As indicated by
the incidents of dowry death and woman battering, it is hard to
counteract cultural traditions even where these acts are illegal.
Since the beginning of time, men have been the norm for all
cultures. Therefore, it is simply not possible to grant women
equal access to social and cultural fields without vast, systemic
alterations in those fields.
Nonetheless, article 1 is quite progressive in its definition
of discrimination against women. It is essentially a two-part
definition. The first part of the definition addresses "any dis-
tinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex."140
The second part of the definition addresses "which has the effect
or purpose of impairing or nullifying"14 1 a woman's access to her
human rights. 142
Part one addresses a variety of situations. It addresses dis-
tinctions; such as adultery being a crime for women but not for
men; exclusions, for instance, exclusively male schools; and re-
strictions, such as so-called protective employment legislation.
This part of the definition represents the concerns of the liber-
als towards equality. The second part of the definition looks at
the effect or purpose of each distinction, exclusion or restriction.
It satisfies concerns about true gender differences and equality.
First, a woman is discriminated against only if the policy has
the effect or purpose of impairing the exercise of her rights.
This allows policies to be made that are based on distinctions
between men and women. These policies are allowed if they are
made in order to overcome or to compensate for past discrimina-
tion or if they are made because of biological differences be-
tween men and women. Second, they must not negatively
139 Punishment Is 18 Months For Killing Cheating Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1994, at A20.
140 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 1.
141 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 1
142 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art 1.
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impact women's human rights. Therefore, affirmative action
programs and pregnancy related policies are allowed as long as
they are not pretextual.
However, the rights guaranteed to women are still rights
that are formulated and implemented with an androcentric
viewpoint. For example, slavery and the slave trade have long
been outlawed in the international community, but only re-
cently has forced prostitution become an issue. Forced prostitu-
tion is viewed as a different issue even though it has all the
earmarks of the slave trade.
Torture perpetrated by a government actor or "with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official" 143 is universally out-
lawed. Since the international community declares that woman
battering does not fit into this definition, it is not considered
torture. This is true even though woman battering is done for
the purpose of "intimidating and coercing"144 a woman. When
the government turns a blind eye to the illegality of such an
assault, the government has "acquiesced" to that behavior. 145
Moreover:
Although the killing of student demonstrators in Tiananmen
Square in Beijing in 1989 produced cries of outrage and calls for
diplomatic isolation, the drowning of girl babies in China does
not. The horrors of apartheid were cause for worldwide condem-
nation and costly economic sanctions, but the fact that a woman is
raped every minute and a half in South Africa is not.146
If the contents of human rights are not changed or ex-
panded, the extent of the benefits a woman will receive is ques-
tionable when she is given equal access to human rights. Once
again, this illustrates, CEDAW's greatest failing. CEDAW only
works to guarantee women equal access to human rights as de-
fined by men. However, this may not have any real meaning to
a woman in her daily life.
143 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 Annex, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/708, Annex, art. 1., (1984) reprinted in 23 I.L.M.
1027 (1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
144 Id.
145 See Broadbent, supra note 57, at B3.
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B. General and Specific Undertakings-Articles 2-16
Articles 2, 3 and 4 of CEDAW outline the "general under-
takings"147 to which States Parties will be held under CEDAW.
Articles 5 through 16 provide for "specific undertakings"148 and
should be understood "in the context of"' 49 article 2. Article 2 of
CEDAW, as modified by the more specific provisions of articles 5
through 16, will be analyzed in this section. Although they am-
plify article 2, articles 3, 4 and 14 also stand alone, and will be
analyzed as creating specific rights for women.
Article 2 of CEDAW outlines the steps that States Parties
must take in order to implement a "policy of eliminating dis-
crimination against women."150 A list of seven legislative/con-
stitutive steps follow, including: changing national
constitutions, if necessary;' 5 ' adopting legislative measures, in-
cluding sanctions, to prohibit discrimination against women; 52
ensuring that national tribunals and other institutions protect
the legal rights of women; 153 eliminating official government
discrimination;15 4 eliminating discrimination practiced by any
"person, organization or enterprise;" 55 modifying or abolishing
"laws, regulations, customs and practices" 56 that discriminate
against women;' 57 and repealing any penal provision that dis-
criminates by gender.'58 The major problem facing article 2,
however, is the large number of reservations submitted by
States Parties to CEDAW. These reservations were second only
to the number of reservations submitted to article 16 which
calls for the elimination of discrimination in the family. 59
In spite of its detail, article 2 does not address the root
cause of discrimination against women, the patriarchal system.
147 Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human
Rights, 7 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 125, 158 (1994).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2.
151 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(a).
152 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(b).
153 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(c).
154 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(d).
155 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(e).
156 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(f).
157 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(f).
158 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(g).
159 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 16.
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Except for Section (f), which calls for the modification of cus-
toms and practices, article 2 calls for the changing of laws and
constitutions that discriminate against women without calling
for the investigation into why these laws were promulgated ini-
tially. Article 2, as is the case with many human rights conven-
tions, 160 is worded in very abstract terms. In addition to
lacking the necessary guidelines for investigating the root cause
of gender discrimination, article 2 does not use language more
powerful than "all appropriate measures"161 in outlining how a
State Party should make the necessary changes for eliminating
gender discrimination. Therefore, it is necessary to rely on arti-
cles 5 through 16 substantively when addressing article 2.
In addition, article 2 does not mandate that women be in-
volved in formulating these changes, even though the impor-
tance of the decision-maker is paramount. "Gender
discrimination is so firmly imbedded in the history of humanity
that it is often not perceived as discrimination,"162 especially by
men. In most societies, the men in power, who may or may not
have been directly involved in the initial promulgation of sexist
constitutions and legislation, are charged with changing these
official enactments to make them non-discriminatory.
It is significant that section (a) calls for an awareness of the
"practical realization"163 of the equality of women and men;
however, it does not address who will determine this practical
realization. Section (b), which calls for the implementation of
sanctions, fails for the same reason. Ensuring the involvement
of women in the decision-making process is imperative. With-
out their involvement, women will only be granted equality
with men as it is defined by men. Male "privilege always gives
160 TOMAsEVSKi, supra note 18, at 120.
161 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2. Rebecca J. Cook contends that States Par-
ties are required to "develop appropriate means with due diligence and apply them
without delay." Cook, supra note 149, at 163. She notes that "appropriate" allows
States Parties to be "sensitive to national legal, political, and social environments,
but criteria of appropriateness are not within the [Sitates [Parties]' exclusive con-
trol." Cook, supra note 147, at 161. As noted throughout this analysis, the author
is concerned with CEDAW's lack of guidelines for States Parties to arrive at appro-
priate measures, especially when CEDAW does not insist that women be included
in this determination.
162 TOMASEVSKI, supra note 18, at 44.
163 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(a).
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[men] permission to frame [their] perceptions as the [t]ruth." 6 4
The involvement of women, however, would foster the "em-
power[ment of] women on [their] own terms .... [Women] seek
not only to be valued as who [they] are, but to have access to the
process of the definition of value itself. In this way, [their] de-
mand for access becomes also a demand for change."165 At best,
the changes will allow women to access the rights and freedoms
enjoyed by men, even though their applicability to a woman's
daily life is limited.
Section (a) calls for States "[t]o embody the principle of the
equality of men and women in their national constitutions or
other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and
to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practi-
cal realization of this principle." 166 Section (b) calls on States
"[tlo adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, includ-
ing sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination
against women."167 Sections (a) and (b) are modified by articles
6, 7, 8, 9 and 15, which call on States Parties to adopt legisla-
tion to deal with the relationship between women and
government.
1. Political and Civil Rights-Articles 2(a), 2(b), 7, 8, 9 & 15
Article 7 deals with the civil and political rights of women.
States Parties are to take "all appropriate measures to elimi-
nate discrimination against women in the political and public
life of the country."168 The subsections of article 7 direct coun-
tries to ensure a woman's right to vote and hold office, 169 to hold
appointed positions within the government as well as partici-
pating in the development and implementation of governmental
policy,' 70 and "to participate in non-governmental organizations
164 Terrence Crowley, The Life of Entitlement, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CuL-
TURE 341, 346 (Emilie Buchwald, et al. eds., 1993).
165 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Not By Law Alone: From a Debate With Phyllis
Schlafly, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW, supra note 60,
at 21, 22.
166 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(a).
167 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(b).
166 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 7.
169 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 7(a).
170 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 7(b).
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and associations concerned with the public and political life of
the country."171
These guarantees are the familiar formal, public and indi-
vidual rights that are associated with liberalism and are con-
ceived to be the same as the human rights of men. 172 However,
as with the more general provisions of article 2, article 7 fails to
address the systemic, underlying cause of a woman's lack of
participation in the political system. 173 In the same way that
cultural traditions are based on an androcentric view of soci-
ety,' 74 liberal democratic structures were created from a male
standard. This precludes a woman's participation in the polit-
ical system. That is, "[e]nfranchisement has not ... led to sub-
stantial formal political participation by women because the
gendered form of liberal democracy was left intact." 7 5
In relatively long established democracies, women only oc-
cupy from 2% to 10% of elected or appointed positions on the
national level.' 76 In Eastern Europe, prior to recent "demo-
cratic reforms," quota systems assured women a percentage of
national positions. Since the quota systems were removed, the
current number of women in these positions has dropped dra-
matically.' 77 This trend indicates that enfranchisement does
not assure the representation of women in the decision-making
process that impacts their lives.
Article 7 subsections (b) and (c) call for the inclusion of wo-
men in government policy-making and implementation. They
also call for the participation of women in non-governmental or-
ganizations that impact policy decisions.' 78 Article 8 calls for
the inclusion of women as representatives of their governments
in international organizations. 79 The subsections to article 7,
171 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 7(c).
172 Dianne Otto, Challenging the "New World Order:" International Law,
Global Democracy and the Possibilities for Women, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 371, 381 (1993).
173 Id.
174 See generally Southard, supra note 19.
175 Otto, supra note 172, at 388.
176 Otto, supra note 172, at 388.
177 Otto, supra note 172, at 388 n.84. "Generally, the percentage of women
elected in national elections has fallen by over half, dropping 80% in Hungary and
90% in Romania." Otto, supra note 172, at 388.
178 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 7(b) & (c).
179 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 8.
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together with article 8, almost assure that women will partici-
pate in the decisions that effect them. However, these general
provisions do not mandate systemic changes, which are needed
to foster the participation of women.
CEDAW mandates a system of equality that continues to
judge women by a male standard. Article 7 calls on States Par-
ties to assure women on equal terms with men participation in
policy-making. 180 This results in the continuation of "the com-
mitment to male, hierarchical structures in all legal and polit-
ical organizations." 181  Women are allowed to become
government ministers and judges, but only if they can function
in the same fashion as men. That is, women can be employed in
these positions if they do not have primary child-care responsi-
bilities, if they have managed to receive the necessary education
and if they can act like men. CEDAW would be more effective in
furthering women's rights if it called for a change in the struc-
ture of government so that it was possible for women to partici-
pate effectively.
Mandating that women be equal to men results in women
being judged by a male standard. Ending women's oppression,
however, "can be achieved only through rules that take account
of the different needs and characteristics of women." 182 For ex-
ample, article 8 requires that women be involved in the foreign
service of a country. This highlights how systemic male stan-
dards of performance cannot work to assure women's participa-
tion in the current androcentric government structure. In the
United States, the entrance test for the foreign service was
found to be biased against female applicants. 183 In addition,
the "diplomatic life-style" is premised on a male officer whose
wife is willing to "accompany her husband on his far-flung post-
ings and missions, and is willing to act as his hostess for a vari-
ety of diplomatic functions." 8 4 Therefore, the number of
postings available to women diplomats are limited. Not only is
this limitation based on the lack of availability of a woman's
husband to play the hostess role, but also on the cultures of var-
180 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 7.
181 Charlesworth et al., supra note 44, at 634.
182 Karen Knop, Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty in Interna-
tional Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 304 & n.41 (1993).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 304-05.
1996]
35
PACE INT'L L. REV.
ious countries, which are less willing to accept women diplo-
mats.18 5 At best, CEDAW requires that States Parties place a
woman in a diplomatic posting but only if she can manage to
pass an androcentric test.
In order to fulfill these diplomatic roles, women must
travel. In societies where freedom to travel is only offered to
men, women are further restricted from diplomatic positions.
Furthermore, women, especially when travelling alone, must
contend with woman-directed violence. In most patriarchal so-
cieties, women are particularly vulnerable to acts of violence,
especially when alone or in unfamiliar places. A petition that
was presented to the Vienna Human Rights Conference recog-
nized the existence of "gender violence, a universal phenomenon
which takes many forms across culture, race and class." 186 Sim-
ply extending to women the androcentric right of freedom to
travel, without addressing issues of woman-directed violence, is
only a partial solution at best.
The fact that some women have become successful in the
civil and political arena does not negate this discussion. The
small number of women who emerge as political leaders are the
exception to the rule. Since the successful political woman is
still an anomaly, she stands out from the crowd.' 87 The ques-
tion still remains, however, why there are few women in polit-
ical and civil leadership roles?
Article 9 calls on States Parties to "grant women equal
rights with men to acquire, change or retain their national-
ity." 88 This article exemplifies why "equality" must be viewed
as a fluid concept. In the area of nationality, laws which dis-
criminate against women are often explicit, the "exclusion" vari-
ety. An example of this type of law is found in the laws of
Gabon: if a woman in Gabon marries a foreigner, she must re-
nounce her citizenship while a man is not held to this same re-
quirement.8 9 A liberal view of equality would correct this
particular inequality. Legislation is required to eliminate gen-
185 Id. at 305.
186 Reifenberg, supra note 146, at B3.
187 The author contends, for example, that many people are familiar with the
name Margaret Thatcher while fewer people are familiar with the name John
Major.
188 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 9.
189 TOMAsEVSKI, supra note 18, at 33-34.
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der and marital status from the determination of citizenship.
Unfortunately, there exists a lack of commitment on the part of
the international community in this area. For example,
although subsumed by CEDAW and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Nationality of Mar-
ried Women1 90 was ratified by less than one-third of the world's
states. 191
Article 15 requires States Parties to "accord to women
equality with men before the law."192 This refers to identical
legal capacity between men and women in civil matters and in
the freedom of movement. It declares null and void any private
contractual agreement that "restrict[s] the legal capacity of wo-
men."193 These changes are clearly necessary since "[e]quality
before the law is a bad joke in many countries where the word of
a man is automatically accorded more value than that of a wo-
men in a court of law."194 Rights accorded to men need to be
afforded to women to provide equality. In order to do this, the
"social preconditions [and] the presumptions that underlie"195
the principle of equality before the law must be examined.
Article 15 mentions equality of legal capacity, particularly
in reference to contracts, to the administration of property and
to court procedure. Equality of access to these precepts as-
sumes an underlying economic, educational and social equality
between men and women. This does not exist and it cannot be
rectified by legislation granting women "legal capacity identical
to that of men."196 Economically, women are disadvantaged in
their ability to enter contracts, to own and transfer property
and to access the courts. Women "earn only one-tenth of the
world's income and own less than 1% of the world's property." 97
As a result, a woman will be the "weaker party" in a contractual
relationship. Not only will women be at a disadvantage as the
"weaker party" to a contract, but they will participate in con-
190 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 309 U.N.T.S. 65 (1957).
191 TOMASEVSKI, supra note 18, at 33.
192 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 15(1).
193 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 15.
194 Broadbent, supra note 57, at B3.
195 MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andrea's Work, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW, supra note 60, at 127, 129.
196 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 15(2).
197 BUMILLER, supra note 127, at 13.
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sumer contracts, not business contracts. Without a concomitant
change in the economic position of women, they will only be
afforded the opportunity to become parties to adhesion
contracts. 198
Levels of education impact upon a woman's ability to bar-
gain and to enter contracts. Currently, "there are more than
130 million more adult women than men in the world who can-
not read and write."199 Besides affecting a woman's ability to
enter a contract, lower levels of education raise questions about
contract enforcement. This is true where women suddenly are
legislated "equal rights to conclude contracts."200 Should wo-
men with less education be held to the same standards of ac-
countability in contract enforcement as men? If not, who is to
determine the different levels of accountability-women who
have experienced discrimination or men who can only imagine
what these experiences are like? As has been discussed
throughout this analysis, there is great danger when one group
makes decisions affecting another group. Women in the United
States have found that rules designated to protect women in the
workplace have "protected" them right out of their jobs.201
Therefore, an inequitable standard for women in the legal inter-
pretation of contractual obligations may result in merchants be-
ing less willing to enter into contracts with female consumers.
The right of women to administer property equally with
men, as contained in article 15, includes transactions involving
one's own property, the ability to inherit property and the man-
agement of a minor's inheritance. Furthermore, article 13(b)
calls for the equal access to "bank loans, mortgages and other
forms of financial credit"20 2 for women. However, discussing a
woman's right to conduct transactions involving her own prop-
erty seems ludicrous when women "own less than 1% of the
198 An adhesion contract is defined as a consumer contract in which the
"weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms." BLAcies LAW DICTIONARY 40
(6th ed. 1990).
199 Mehren, supra note 70, at 1. In addition, the gap between educated women
and men is widening. "In 1950, there were 27 million more boys than girls enrolled
in primary and secondary levels of education around the world. Currently there
are 80 million more boys than girls enrolled." Merhen, supra note 70, at 1.
200 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 15(2).
201 See, e.g., HERMA HILL KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEx-BASED Dis-
CRIMINATION 8 (3d ed. 1988).
202 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 13(b).
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world's property."203 Yet, "[p]roperty is fundamental to eco-
nomic identity."20 4 Lack of property ownership not only im-
pacts the ability to be involved in property transactions, but it
denies one an "economic identity." In article 15, CEDAW pro-
vides an inadequate response to women's economic problems.
Revisions are needed in the concepts of property acquisition and
ownership. Property could be viewed, for example, as owned by
entire families or other groups, rather than by (usually male)
heads of households. Women have had great success in organiz-
ing cooperatives for the ownership of property.
Article 2(a) calls on States Parties to "embody the principle
of the equality of men and women"20 5 in national constitutions
and legislation, but it is vague as to method and measurement
of success. Women are judged by a male standard; hence, the
more a woman acts like a man, the more she will be treated
"equally". The level of change necessary in a country must be
"appropriate" to reach the "equality of men and women."206 The
lack of specificity of the language used in article 2, however, en-
courages a system whereby women strive for equality based
upon men, rather than the equitable treatment of all persons,
regardless of gender.
2. Solely on the Basis of Sex - Article 6
Article 2(b) calls on States Parties "[t]o adopt appropriate
legislative and other measures, including sanctions where ap-
propriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women."20 7
According to article 1,
discrimination against women [is] any distinction, exclusion or re-
striction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose
of impairing or nullibying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equal-
ity of men and women, of human rights and fundamental free-
203 Barber Conable, President of the World Bank, quoted in BUMILLER, supra
note 127, at 13.
204 Marsha A. Freeman, Women, Development and Justice: Using the Interna-
tional Convention on Women's Rights, in OuRs By RIGi-r: WOMEN'S RIGHTS As
HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20 at 93, 99.
205 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(a).
206 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(a).
207 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(b).
1996]
39
PACE INT'L L. REV.
doms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other
field.208
This definition of discrimination embodies the principle of
eliminating "distinction... on the basis of sex." Therefore, the
analysis of article 2(a) applies to subsection (b). These two sub-
sections are then modified by the succeeding articles. For ex-
ample, an analysis of equality "in all stages of procedure in
courts and tribunals" shows that in some legal systems a man's
word is accorded more weight than a woman's.20 9 This dispar-
ity reflects the inequality between men and women and the bla-
tant discrimination against women.
Article 6, however, presents an example of the impairment
of a woman's "human rights and fundamental freedom [that is
based solely] on . . . sex."210 The abolishment of slavery and
slave trade is among the oldest of the universally recognized
civil rights. 211 Additionally, trafficking in women has long been
discussed in the human rights community. The topic "was
among the principle issues of the anti-slavery action from the
very beginning."2 12 Article 6 calls on States Parties to "take all
appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all
forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of wo-
men."21 3 Even though "international standards of perform-
ance"214 are available to governments to incorporate into their
legislation to suppress trafficking of women and forced prostitu-
tion, these activities continue to be a world-wide industry.21 5
The multi-national sex-industry is based on a patriarchal
system that objectifies a woman's body, while demanding that a
"good" woman only have sex with one man. If a man abandons
a woman, she often has few options but to use her body, which
is now "considered worthless, . . . [as an] instrument[ ] to earn a
living."216 It is the economic aspect of the sex-industry that is
208 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 1.
209 See Broadbent, supra note 57, at B3.
210 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 1.
211 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, at art. 4;
Tom~sEvsiu, supra note 18, at 13-15.
212 ToMASEvsKI, supra note 18, at 13.
213 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 6.
214 Cook, supra note 147, at 161.
215 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 45.
216 WETrZEL, supra note 51, at 44.
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often overlooked. Prostitution is one of the most financially lu-
crative jobs available to women. When women the world over
earn only one-third to two-thirds of a man's income, 217 the sex-
industry jobs can provide women with greater financial stabil-
ity. Therefore, in addition to outlawing trafficking in women,
States Parties must deal with the patriarchal view of a woman's
sexuality and the economic issues that contribute to the sex-
industry.
A frequent liberal response to outlawing prostitution and
trafficking of women is that women will be robbed of their
choice to participate in these activities. Since the sex-industry
is based on a patriarchal objectification of a woman's body and
her sexuality, women participate in this industry within the
male construct of a woman. This construct, which displays a
woman's sexuality as forbidden, mysterious and immoral, leads
to an economic valuation of women. This perpetuates the view
that a woman's sexuality is a commodity that is available to
men.
Other manifestations of this objectification include: women
mutilated in ways that men are not; women segregated from
society in ways that men are not; women sold into marriage in
ways that men are not; and women as the victims of intimate
violence in ways that men are not. These activities are based on
the male construct of a women, which is seen as the norm. It is
because a woman's sexuality is forbidden that a market exists
in which a woman can sell her sexuality. Under the male con-
struct, a women never actually makes a free choice to partici-
pate in prostitution.
The phrase, "all appropriate measures," in article 6 confers
on States Parties an "obligation to act in accordance with inter-
national standards of performance." 218 On the issues of forced
prostitution and trafficking of women, the international com-
munity has a legal framework in place to judge the performance
of States Parties. In addition to article 6 of CEDAW, the Con-
vention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
217 United Nations Development Programme, HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
21-22 (1992).
218 Cook, supra note 147, at 161.
1996]
41
PACE INT'L L. REV.
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others219 and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child have addressed these issues. 220 How-
ever, more is needed to address the underlying economic and
gender oppression of the sex-industry. Education is necessary
and must be aimed not only at the procurers and consumers of
the sex-industry, but at the general public and the women who
participate in this industry.
The sex-industry of some countries is a selling point for
business-tourists from more developed countries. These busi-
ness-tourists and others who use the sex-industry encourage its
continuation. Therefore, they should be penalized for their par-
ticipation. Furthermore, States Parties should be vigilant to
the practice of importing women via bogus marriage or employ-
ment offers. 221 Ultimately, participation in the sex-industry
will continue if women are still valued based on their bodies.
This is especially true where the economic structure does not
provide women with the opportunity to support themselves.
3. Judicial and Law Enforcement Rights - Article 2(c)
Article 2(c) addresses the special legal relationship between
women and the courts. It calls on State Parties "[t]o establish
legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with
men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and
other public institutions the effective protection of women
against any act of discrimination."222 In this way, section (c)
mandates that States Parties actively and effectively protect
the rights of women via law enforcement and the courts.
The role of the judiciary exemplifies what happens when
women are not involved in the decisions to eliminate gender dis-
crimination. If a society gives to plaintiffs and defendants the
right to be represented by an attorney, but women have not had
access to attorneys, changing the law to guarantee women ac-
cess to attorneys appears, on its face, to remedy the discrimina-
tion. It ignores, however, the fact that in such a society, women
probably do not have the financial means to hire an attorney.
219 Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Ex-
ploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 96 U.N.T.S. 272 (1950).
220 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 106.
221 TOMASEVSKi, supra note 18, at 16.
222 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(c).
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Furthermore, the barrier of a woman talking to a "strange" man
may be too difficult for some women to overcome. Therefore,
training female attorneys, providing for government-paid attor-
neys and other systemic changes are not only desirable, but ab-
solutely necessary.
In addition, the input of women into changes in the judicial
system will reveal that all segments of the system must work
together. It is not enough to require judges to impose
mandatory sentences for crimes against women if prosecutors
do not prosecute. It does not help to require prosecutors to
bring charges if police do not arrest. 223 Women, particularly
those who are or have been victims of woman battering, under-
stand that the system must work in concert to address not only
violence against women but the causes of such violence.
An example from the United States experience with woman
battering points out inherent problems when the underlying
causes of violence against women are not explored in the judi-
cial context. In the last few decades, mediation has been popu-
lar in the United States Court system as an alternative method
for settling legal claims, particularly in the family law arena. 224
The validity of mediation is based on its conception as a discus-
sion between equals. Its purpose is to arrive at a mutual deci-
sion without assessing blame. Even ignoring the fact that a
patriarchy itself results in an unequal distribution of power be-
tween spouses, the battering of one spouse by the other cer-
tainly skews the balance. It is impossible to solve the problem
of violence in this context and impossible for the victim of vio-
lence and the perpetrator to be participants with equal bargain-
ing power. Yet, mediation in marital issues continues, usually
without consideration of the presence or absence of violence.
Moreover, article 2(c) protects women from discrimination
through "public institutions" other than the courts. Dealing
with woman battering in the United States highlights the real-
ity of discrimination against women, where women are not "ef-
fectively protect[ed]," even when existing laws appear to apply.
The Model Penal Code provides definitions for simple assault (a
223 See, Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextualization of Domestic Violence, 83 J.
CRIM. L. 217, 221 (1992).
224 Mary Pat Treuthart, In Harm's Way? Family Mediation and the Role of the
Attorney Advocate, 23 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV 717, 719 (1993).
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misdemeanor) and aggravated assault (a second- or third-de-
gree felony).225 The major differences between misdemeanor
and felony assault are that to be a felony, the perpetrator must
"manifest extreme indifference to the value of human life"226 or
use a "deadly weapon."227 Despite the fact that many assaults
in the domestic setting either disregard "the value of human
life" or involve a weapon, "most police charge domestic violence
offenses only as misdemeanors." 228 Furthermore, police usu-
ally cannot arrest on a misdemeanor without actually witness-
ing the assault, thus in the past, arrests were rarely made at
all. In response, feminists demanded mandatory arrest laws
that require police to arrest batterers. Notwithstanding that
laws specifically directed at woman battering and domestic vio-
lence were sorely needed, it is a sad commentary that they were
needed at all. Although laws which could have protected wo-
men were on the books, female victims did not receive "effective
protection" from the police. The relationship of the victim to the
perpetrator should never be an issue, since causing bodily harm
to another individual is always assault.
4. Education and Health Care - Articles 2(d), 7, 10 & 12
Section (d) of article 2 requires States Parties "[t]o refrain
from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against
women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions
shall act in conformity with this obligation."229 Therefore, in
addition to section (c) protection of women's rights, section (d)
prohibits the "public authorities and institutions" of the States
Parties from engaging in any discrimination themselves. This
section is modified by articles 7, 10 and 12, to the extent that
articles 10 and 12 relate to government sponsored education
and health services. However, once again, CEDAW calls on
States Parties to implement laws and regulations, define inju-
ries and impose sanctions, from a standpoint that has no guar-
antee of including women's views. The ability "[t]o make a deep
change in something that, once it exists, apparently has never
225 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1962).
226 Id. at (2)(a).
227 Id. at (2)(b).
228 Joan Zorza, Criminal Law: the Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Vi-
olence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. 46, 61 (1992).
229 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(d).
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not existed - and sex inequality has changed little if sex equal-
ity is your standard - requires a new way of thinking, not just
thinking about new things."230 In addition, it requires the
thinking of previously excluded groups. However, like other
Sections of CEDAW, article 2(d) merely requires "thinking
about new things" by the same decision makers.
Article 7 directs States Parties to eliminate discrimination
against women in public life and deals with voting and office
holding issues. Article 7 also modifies section (a). Section (a)
relates to changes in the written law and (d) relates to changes
in the actions of the government and other public institutions.
However, articles 10 and 12 relate to specific services provided
through public institutions and, together with article 2(d), ad-
dress how these institutions should treat women.
Article 10 is aimed at eliminating discrimination in educa-
tion. It is a highly detailed article, addressing guidance coun-
seling; access to, and achievement in educational institutions at
all levels; stereotyping of women and men in educational mater-
ials; scholarships and grants; and continuing education. This
article addresses the drop-out rates of women and girls, availa-
bility of sports and physical education and "[a]ccess to specific
educational information to help ensure the health and well-be-
ing of families, including information and advice on family plan-
ning."231 Section (h), relating to family planning and health
and section (c), calling for the elimination of gender stereotyp-
ing in education, make this article a less androcentric approach
to equality. Still, article 10 only touches on the systemic patri-
archy in education and, therefore, will benefit mainly the wo-
men who are able to live up to a male standard.
As Tomagevski has noted, education for women must have
as its main goal the empowerment of women as individuals and
as a group. "For women, the process of empowerment entails
breaking away from the cycle of learned and taught submission
to discrimination, ..."232 Yet, sections (a), (b), (d), (e) and (g) of
article 10 offer women the same conditions and the same curric-
ula and the same opportunities as those offered to men. Con-
230 CATHERINE A. MACKiNNON, The Art of the Impossible, in, FEMINISM UN-
MODIFIED, supra note 60, at 1, 9.
231 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 10(a)-(h).
232 ToM.SEvsmu, supra note 18, at 24.
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versely, sections (c), (f) and (h) address educational issues
directly relating to women. Section (c) mandates,
[tihe elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men
and women at all levels and in all forms of education by encourag-
ing coeducation and other types of education which will help
achieve this aim and, in particular, by the revision of textbooks
and school programmes and the adaptation of teaching
methods."233
This section would be strengthened by a call for more women
teachers to act as role models for both girls and boys. Nonethe-
less, elimination of stereotypes is vital to the realization of wo-
men's human rights. What becomes important, as with other
issues facing women, is who decides what is a stereotype and
how to eliminate it.
Marger defines stereotypes as "overly simplistic and exag-
gerated beliefs about a group, generally acquired second hand
and resistant to change."234 Stereotyping masks how "the domi-
nant group, through the process of the self-fulfilling prophecy,
may contribute to the very creation of these unfavorable
traits."235 Marger was referring to stereotypes imputed to eth-
nic groups and parts of the definition may not seem to apply to
women. For example, to the men holding the stereotypes, the
traits in question may not be obviously "unfavorable." There-
fore, while stereotypes labeling ethnic or religious groups as
"greedy," "lazy" or "violent" are clearly unfavorable, the charac-
teristics attributed to women may seem favorable. Women are
"nurturing," "gentle" and "intuitive,"236 traits that may be con-
sidered complimentary. If members of the dominant group are
charged with eliminating the stereotypical views of women
presented in educational materials, the damage of this type of
233 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 10(c).
234 MARTIN N. MARGER, RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 47 (1985).
235 Id.
236 Certainly, some stereotypes of women are clearly unfavorable, such as wo-
men are "manipulative" or are "gossips." And, some stereotypes are less clearly
either favorable or unfavorable, such as women are "(physically) weak" or "soft."
Many of the traits stereotypically applied to women, however, are superficially
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stereotyping may not be obvious and the stereotypes may be
overlooked.
The stereotypes of women are also particularly pernicious
because they appear to be "based on the biological imperatives
of sex."237 Children must be born by women and therefore,
"bearing and rearing children, their most important role, de-
fines their entire lives."238 Even women who have no children
or are beyond their child bearing and rearing time are consid-
ered to be praised when the characteristics associated with ide-
alized motherhood are ascribed to them. Since these character
traits are associated with biological characteristics, they are not
recognized, often even by women, as stereotypes that carry with
them the damage and restrictions that all stereotypes do. Men
sometimes cannot understand how a woman could be offended
at being called nurturing. Being recognized as nurturing is not
a problem. Being stereotyped as nurturing is a problem.
Section (c) calls for the elimination of "any stereotyped con-
cept of the roles of men and women."239 It will be more difficult
for the dominant group to recognize the stereotypes of men
presented in educational material. For instance, a school text
that depicts all women as mothers, with perhaps a few female
teachers and nurses, may be changed to include some women as
school administrators and doctors, but it should also be changed
to depict men as teachers and nurses and fathers.
The stereotyping of women causes damage by restricting
women, and men, in their respective life choices. Alleged male
characteristics of competitiveness and objectivity become asso-
ciated with particular "male" fields of study, while a woman,
stereotyped as less competitive and more empathetic, is consid-
ered to lack the necessary characteristics for a particular field.
Thus, characteristics are viewed as belonging to the endeavor
itself and not as male conceptions of the endeavor. Therefore,
individual women will not be encouraged to enter traditionally
male fields and will be encouraged to remain in traditionally
female fields. Conversely, males, viewed as inherently objective
and action-oriented, will not be encouraged to train for a job
237 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 154.
238 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 155.
239 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 10(c).
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that requires patience and connection. Both genders lose.240
The alleged biological connections of these gender stereotypes
make them appear to be real and natural, not characteristics
that are "overly simplistic and exaggerated beliefs."241
The female biological ability to bear children also contrib-
utes to the benefits that the dominant male group receives from
stereotyping women into a few limited roles and range of activi-
ties. The bearing of children is necessary in any culture in or-
der for society to survive. In some nationalistic movements it is
imperative, and a woman is patriotic only when she has a large
number of children.242 Women are defined, classified, and un-
derstood as producers of the next generation of citizens.243
When women are stereotyped into domestic and child-rearing
roles, men benefit by having domestic workers to care for their
homes and children, freeing them to participate in the public
world.
Section (c) of article 10 is impressive in its notice and call
for the elimination of stereotyping of women, even in spite of its
lack of an understanding that women must contribute to this
change. However, unfortunately, section (h) contributes to the
continuation of the maternal stereotyping of women. Article 12,
which addresses family planning and maternal care, also con-
tributes to the perpetuation of this stereotype. 244 It is difficult
to deny that "educational information to help to ensure the
health and well-being of families, including information and ad-
vice on family planning"245 is imperative for the well-being of
women, as well as men. However, its inclusion in a Convention
relating to women's human rights perpetuates the beliefs that a
240 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 33 ("It is not that all men are aggressive and all
women servile, but rather that the universal system of patriarchy does not allow
men to behave in a gentle, caring manner and women to reject the stereotype of
compliance without being ostracized.").
241 MARGER, supra note 234.
242 It is interesting that in China, overpopulation is such a significant problem
that women, unlike in other countries, are patriotic when they have only one child.
It is still system that defines and controls women based on their child bearing
activities.
243 E.g., Seny Diagne, Defending Women's Rights - Facts and Challenges in
Francophone Africa, in, OuRs BY RIGHr, supra note 20, at 43, 47 ("Women [in Af-
rica] are considered child-bearers before being considered women.").
244 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 12.
245 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 10(h).
[Vol. 8:1
48http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss1/1
PROTECTION OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS
woman's major role in life to take care of her family and that
women are primarily responsible for family planning.246 Denial
of family planning information is devastating for the health and
well-being of women, but, "[r]educing the discussion of family
planning to women may indeed contribute to the tolerance of
irresponsible fatherhood. -247 CEDAW does not require that
family planning information and information on the health and
well-being of families should only be imparted to women. How-
ever, addressing it in a convention intended to deal with wo-
men's human rights issues does entrench family issues even
more firmly in the world of women. This is a stereotype that
was apparently not recognized by the drafters of the
Convention.
Article 12 adds the responsibility of States Parties to pro-
vide "appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, con-
finement and the post-natal period, granting free services
where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during preg-
nancy and lactation."248 It is clear that "maternal mortality is
the single most neglected health problem in the third world,"249
and, "[e]ven in relatively well off countries like the United
States, health conditions are shocking."250 The reality is that
women die because of their biological disposition to child bear-
ing. They die from bad abortions, the unavailability of abor-
tions, from having too many children too close together, from
lack of pre-natal care and unattended childbirth.251 The draft-
ers of CEDAW would have been remiss had they not addressed
these issues. However, as part of the major human rights con-
vention relating to women, these articles continue the belief
that family planning is exclusively the province of women.
Although men in power in governments and religion feel free to
dictate the policies on abortion and birth control that women
should follow, ultimate responsibility for family planning falls
on the woman. Although no woman ever managed to get preg-
nant all by herself, the male role in family planning, or the lack
of it, is seldom recognized.
246 See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
247 TOmAaEVSKI, supra note 18, at 17.
248 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 12(2).
249 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 110.
250 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 108.
251 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 110.
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In addition, these articles perpetuate the belief that having
children, whether responsibly or not, is a woman's primary role
in life. This belief limits the life choices of women who choose
not to give birth. When the birth of children is tied closely to the
institution of marriage, as is true universally, this impacts wo-
men who would otherwise choose not to marry, whether they
have children or not. Ultimately, the patriarchal pattern is re-
inforced. A feminist vision of the human rights of women in
this area includes the responsibility of men for the children they
father and for the role they play in family planning. Although
CEDAW does not mandate that family planning information be
given only to women, it does not discuss the role of men in the
issue of reproduction.
Conversely, section (f) of article 10 singles women out from
men in a positive fashion. It addresses the needs of "girls and
women who have left school prematurely."252 Girls and women
who have dropped out of school may have often done so due to
problems they face because they are female. From teenage
marriage and pregnancy to the decision that a daughter's edu-
cation is less important than a son's, girls and women fre-
quently do not complete as many years of education as boys and
men do. "Currently there are 80 million more boys than girls
enrolled [in primary and secondary levels of education around
the world]."2 53 Section (f) urges States Parties to work to lower
the female drop-out rate and to provide "programmes for girls
and women who have left school prematurely."254 A stronger
section would call for States Parties to provide female drop-outs
with the opportunity to form their own programs and self-help
groups, in the same way that article 14(e) does for rural
women.
255
It is necessary to pay special attention to the reasons why
there is generally a higher rate of female drop-outs than male.
These high rates can be attributed to factors such as teenage
pregnancy and marriage, forced participation by young women
in sex trades, and the general devaluing of girl children com-
252 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 10(f).
253 Mehren, supra note 70, at 1.
254 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 10(f).
255 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(e). Mandates the right of rural women
"t]o organize self-help groups and co-operatives in order to obtain equal access to
economic opportunities through employment or self-employment." Id.
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pared to boy children. The stereotyping of women that primar-
ily relegates them to the role of mother conveys the idea that
the ability to be a mother is instinctive. Even though women are
responsible for the education of their children, it is often
thought that women do not need an education in order to be
good mothers.
5. Non-Governmental Discrimination - Articles 2(e), 11 &
13
Section (e) of article 2 requires States Parties "[t]o take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against wo-
men by any person, organization or enterprise."256 To the ex-
tent that education and health care are provided privately
rather than by the government, articles 10 and 12 modify this
section, as they modify section (d). In addition, section (e) is
modified by articles 11 and 13. Article 11 calls on States Parties
to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in the field of employment,"257 and article 13
mandates the elimination of discrimination in "other areas of
economic and social life."258
As noted, the CEDAW definition of discrimination includes
the element of "a basis of equality of men and women."259
Therefore, article 11(1) offers women access to outside-the-home
employment on an equal basis with men. Women gain the right
to "the same employment opportunities" and to have "the same
criteria for selection in matters of employment" as men.260 This
again creates a situation where the women who can best emu-
late the men will be rewarded with equal treatment at work.
Article 11 does not include any discussion of the possible sys-
temic barriers women face in attaining employment. First
among those barriers is that work outside the home is largely
structured by and for men.
The drawback of this omission is illustrated by the move-
ments in the United States for equal employment opportunity
for women. Laws were passed which prevented women from be-
256 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(e).
257 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 11(1).
258 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 13.
259 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 1.
260 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 11(b).
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ing denied employment based solely on their sex, but issues of
pregnancy and childcare were left unaddressed (until recently).
Women were afforded the right to compete in a man's employ-
ment world where male employees find it easier then their fe-
male counterparts. For example, it is easier for men to work
overtime and travel in their jobs because other people (their
wives) are primarily responsibile for child care. Men usually
have no problem working until 5:00 p.m. or beyond, although
their children may get out of school much earlier, because their
wives pick up and care for their children. On the whole, women
do not have the same luxury. Nonetheless, flexible hours of
work have not been discussed in the context of employment dis-
crimination (at least by the decision makers). This kind of flexi-
bility would allow women to work and care for their children, as
well as, hopefully, allow men to participate in the care of their
children. A change in the regime of the outside-the-home work
world is necessary in order to provide women equality in the
employment field.
Furthermore, article 11 does not address the fact that "[t]he
majority of women in the world work, but a minority are recog-
nized as workers."261 A majority of the world's women perform
activities that are vital, and yet are not considered work. They
raise children, maintain households, run the family farm, yet
they are not counted among the world's work force. The serv-
ices women provide without remuneration allow those who are
counted as workers (largely men) to be free to pursue an
outside-the-home career, because men are relieved from doing
the household and childcare duties. Bumiller tells the story of
an Indian couple which illustrates this inequity. This example
demonstrates that the support women provide men allows them
to pursue their work while that same support and its provider
are devalued by society.
In the government census, a man like Phula's husband [a farmer
who employed up to 15 people a day] would be listed as the head
of the household, which he was, but a wife like Phula would be
considered a nonworking dependent. And yet consider what she
did all day: Yesterday I got up at five in the morning.... After
rising, Phula walked half an hour into the fields, because the fam-
ily had no latrine, then half an hour back. When she returned,
261 ToMAAEvsKu, supra note 18, at 50.
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she cleaned the pots used for the meal the night before. Soap was
a luxury, so she used mud and water, scraping with her bare
hands. She swept the floor of the house, squatting over a short-
handled broom, then walked back to the fields to collect tall
grasses for her cows to eat. This took several hours because she
had to remove all the thorns. She fed the animals, then went into
the house to make lunch for herself and her husband - the lentil
stew called dal, and chapaties and rice. She rested during the
heat of the afternoon, then got up to wash the pots before dinner.
A dozen times during the day she had to fetch water from the well
outside her house; she also had to make cow-dung cakes for fuel.
And this was a leisurely time of year. In a few weeks, when the
wheat was ready for harvesting, she would have to spend most of
her time in the fields, managing her household chores in
between.2 62
Phula is representative of women worldwide, women who
work more hours than men, and whose work include a greater
variety of chores. 26 3 Phula and millions of women around the
world are considered non-working dependents of their hus-
bands. Consider the difficulty Phula's husband would have in
doing his "real" work if Phula was not providing the necessary
support services.
Article 11 addresses the problem of devaluation of the kind
of work done by women, even when it is paid work. Although
"women perform two-thirds of the work in the world... [they]
receive one-tenth of the income .... ,,264 The difference in the
income earned by women and men who do the same or similiar
tasks reflects the fact that women's work is unpaid. It reflects
blatant practices of underpaying women who do the same jobs
as men and it reflects the devaluation of jobs that are predomi-
nantly held by women. 265 CEDAW addresses this issue in arti-
cle 11(d), calling for "equal remuneration, including benefits,
262 BUMILLER, supra note 127, at 88.
263 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 88.
264 Ayla Baffoun, Feminism and Muslim Fundamentalism: The Tunisian and
Algerian Cases, in IDENTITY POLITICS & WOMEN: CULTURAL REASSERTIONS AND
FEMINISMS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 167, 169 (Valentine M. Moghadam ed.,
1994).
265 MICHAEL E. GOLD, A DIALOGUE ON COMPARABLE WORTH 7 (1983) (In the
United States, for example, "[a] study based on 1970 census data showed that each
additional percentage point of women in an occupation resulted in a drop in me-
dian compensation for that occupation of forty-two dollars a year.").
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and . . .equal treatment in respect of work of equal value
... "266 Section (d) also mandates the "equality of treatment in
the evaluation of the quality of work."267 Evaluation of the
quality of work is the method by which jobs are measured to
determine their value and this evaluation leads to the determi-
nation of the amount of pay that workers receive for jobs that
are of equal value.268
This visionary section is imperative to raising the standard
of living of women and to assuring true equality between wo-
men and men. "The treatment of women as inferior or of secon-
dary importance is widely perceived by governments to be
justified because women's contributions are considered to be
marginal or subsidiary."26 9 Unfortunately, merely changing the
perceptions and treatment of women's outside-the-home work
will not in itself serve to improve the perceptions and treatment
of women in society as a whole. For instance, the belief that
married women have the right to work outside the home with-
out their husbands' permission is not universal.270 In addition,
the contribution made by women who work inside the home,
and who are usually uncompensated, must be evaluated in a
fashion that recognizes its economic worth.271 The majority of
the work done by women is in the private sphere of the home.
Because "[t]raditionally,... greater significance is attached to
the public, male world than to the private, female one, . . .[a]
universal pattern of identifying women's activities as private,
and thus of lesser value, can be detected."272 While comparable
worth programs in the public sector are extremely important in
the fight to recognize women's human rights, as well as in the
battle against a patriarchal structure, massive systemic
changes are needed to eliminate the perception that the work
done by women is work of low value.
Section (f) of article 11 guarantees women equality in "[tihe
right to protection of health and safety in working conditions,
266 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 11(d).
267 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 11(d).
266 GOLD, supra note 265, at 41 (Gold discusses the practical problems of job
evaluation) in Id. at 40-54.
269 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 91.
270 ToMAsEvsIu, supra note 18, at 24-25.
271 TOMASEVSKI, supra note 18, at 25. See also, WETZEL, supra note 51, at 91.
272 Charlesworth et al., supra note 44, at 626.
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including the safeguarding of the function of reproduction." 273
The second clause of this section refers to what is commonly
known as "protective legislation." Protective legislation encom-
passes rules which provide special protections for women work-
ers because of their biological reproductive capabilities. These
rules often represent the kind of discrimination against women
that is easily overlooked, particularly because the affected
group (that is, women workers in certain job categories) are not
consulted during the formulation of the rules. As section 2(a)-
(d) of article 11 notes, women workers need protection from ar-
bitrary dismissal, lack of maternity leave and lack of childcare
services, in order to effectively work outside the home. How-
ever, this form of protective legislation is too often applied in a
paternalistic and discriminatory fashion resulting in more
harm than good. 274 Therefore, section 3 of article 11, correctly
calls on States Parties to periodically review protective legisla-
tion in view of advancing technology.
Unfortunately, this type of review is insufficient to protect
women from legislation that has a discriminatory effect. If re-
view of this type is conducted without the input of women work-
ers, the protections required for "safeguarding the function of
reproduction" may be determined by male managers' ideas
about the protection necessary for pregnant women and for wo-
men of child-bearing age. This may lead to discriminatory
treatment, particularly of women who are not pregnant, but
merely of childbearing age. Fed by the myth that a woman's
major function is the bearing of children, she may be denied a
job or advancement based on her potential to bear children,
with no regard for her intentions. If a woman can prove her
inability to have children, she may be exempt from protective
rules; women have even chosen sterilization over losing their
job.275 On the other hand, ignoring the potential for reproduc-
tive damage in certain work settings, and failing to provide wo-
men workers the choice to opt out of such jobs, places women in
a dilemma in which they must choose between having a child
273 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 11(.
274 See, e.g., KAY, supra note 201, at 8.
275 This was the choice of one of the original plaintiffs in Automobile Workers
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 192 (1991).
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and having a job.276 Protective legislation often denies women
the autonomy men have over their lives.
Finally, protective legislation serves to perpetuate stereo-
types about women and their ability to function in certain set-
tings. In the United States, for example, women have been
"protected" from participating in society as lawyers, 277 as em-
ployees working more than ten hours a day,278 and as bartend-
ers (although they could hold the less lucrative job of
waitress).279 Although these cases are no longer law in the
United States, they highlight the insidious discrimination that
may lie in protective legislation. What is the difference between
the presence of a woman waitress in a tavern and a woman bar-
tender?280 The real difference between the two jobs was that
the bartender was paid better and the men wanted to keep the
bartender jobs part of the male preserve. As demonstrated pre-
viously, male dominated jobs traditionally pay better than fe-
male dominated jobs. 281 Protective legislation that prohibits
women from certain professions must always be examined with
the pay differential as the background.
Concerns about the discrimination often lurking in "protec-
tive legislation" should not serve to deny women protection
when they do choose to bear and rear children. It is not outmo-
ded stereotypes and assumptions that result in the fact that
only women can get pregnant and bear children. It is biological
reality. The major difference between protective legislation
aimed at women and protective legislation related to child bear-
ing issues is that the latter is aimed at people engaged in child-
bearing and child-rearing. 28 2 Article 11(2) protects pregnant,
child-rearing and married women (who may be discriminated
against because employers assume they will become pregnant)
276 Id. at 206.
277 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130.
278 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). Only women were denied this type
of employment, in spite of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court had held three
years previously that the states had no business dictating employees' hours of
work. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
279 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948).
280 Indeed, the daughters and wives of tavern owners were exempt from the
prohibition. Id. at 465.
281 Supra note 264 and accompanying text.
282 TOMAsEVSKI, supra note 18, at 20.
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from dismissal,283 denial of maternity leave with guarantees of
return to work 28 4 and protection from work that is harmful dur-
ing pregnancy. 285 It also "encourage[s] .. .the establishment
and development of a network of child-care facilities."286
Protection for pregnant workers is vital. However, until
policy recognizes that "child-bearing is biologically determined,
while child-rearing is not,"28 7 legislation only aimed at women
raising children will help ensure that women remain primarily
responsible for child rearing. Stereotypes regarding women and
their relationship to children will remain and will continue to
appear reflective of "nature," rather than imposed preferences.
As long as women are primarily responsible for the raising of
children, it is necessary to include provisions regarding child
care in a woman's convention. It is unfortunate that its very
inclusion, however, perpetuates as natural and based on biology
the notion that the raising of children causes an interruption in
the outside-the-home work of women, but no interruption in the
work lives of men.
Article 13 relates, in sections (a) and (b) to issues having to
do with female heads of households and the autonomy of women
and their finances. Section (c) mandates the elimination of dis-
crimination against women in "recreational activities, sports
and all aspects of cultural life."288 Section (c) has largely been
dealt with in the discussions of other cultural issues. Section
(a) calls on States Parties to "take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women... [and] to ensure, on
a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in par-
ticular... the right to family benefits."289 As noted in the dis-
cussion on rural women and development aid,29° government
benefits are often distributed based on out-moded notions of
"families" and who heads them. In reality, "[wiomen are the
main providers for one-third of all families in the world, and
283 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 11(2)(a).
28 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 11(2)(b).
285 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 11(2)(d).
286 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 11(2)(c).
287 TOMASEVSKI, supra note 18, at 21.
288 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 13.
289 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 13(a).
290 See infra, notes 391-405 and accompanying text.
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two-thirds of the poorest."29 1 Inclusion of women's access to
family benefits is extremely important in a world where "fami-
lies are called 'female-headed' only when men do not live in
them."292 This section would be even stronger if it included a
new and flexible definition of family, one that made it clear that
not every family is made of father, mother and children.
Section (b) relates to women's access to "bank loans, mort-
gages and other forms of financial credit."293 CEDAW ignores,
however, the inequitable distribution of capital, land ownership
and income between women and men. These are the prerequi-
sites on which credit is based. Wetzel maintains that credit
should be considered in itself a human right. She notes, "[t]he
logic behind the notion that the poor should not have access to
credit has always been considered infallible. It is argued that
because they cannot provide collateral, there is no basis for
making loans to them."294 Added to this belief is the fact that
"[tihe feminization of poverty has reached global propor-
tions,"295 resulting in women having minimal access to credit.
CEDAW only mandates that States Parties assure women ac-
cess "on a basis of equality"296 with men to financial credit. It is
once again the women who are best able to emulate men, in that
they own land or have other resources that most women do not,
who will be able to take advantage of this Section. A bank can
no longer deny a woman credit simply because of her gender,
but this section does not address the issues underlying women's
ability to receive credit.
In addition, it has been proven that traditional conceptions
of credit are not the only conceptions that make sense. The
Bangladeshi's Grameen Bank has demonstrated remarkable
success in making loans to their customers, largely poor rural
women. 297 The bank recommends these guidelines for provid-
ing credit, guidelines that do not depend on the traditional be-
lief that only those who have capital can borrow capital:
291 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 88.
292 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 154.
293 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 13(b).
294 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 92.
295 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 88.
296 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 13.
297 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 92.
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(1) provision of collateral-free loans; (2) formation of small homog-
enous groups for group guarantee of loans and supervision of loan
utilization; (3) taking credit services to women; (4) participation of
bank staffs in social development activities for the borrowers; (5)
recovery of loans in small regular installments; (6) developing in-
stitutions for collective savings for the mutual benefit of the bor-
rowers in times of distress; (7) providing intensive practical
training for developing a well-motivated dedicated cadre of work-
ers and organizers who would deliver credit to women. 29
These guidelines would benefit men in poverty, as well as wo-
men generally. Yet, CEDAW makes no such far-sighted man-
date. Instead, article 13(b) continues in the tradition of
assuring that banks, while they presumably cannot deny credit
solely on the basis of gender, will tender credit only to those
women who are able to live up to an androcentric definition of
financial success.
6. Customary Discrimination - Articles 2(t), 5, 10, 11 & 16
Section (f) of article 2 directs States Parties to go beyond
laws and regulations in combatting gender discrimination. This
Section directs governments "[tlo take all appropriate meas-
ures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimina-
tion against women."2 99 The absolute necessity of altering cus-
toms and practices is clear when one considers traditions such
as female genital mutilation, the veiling of women, dowry and
dowry deaths and woman battering which contribute signifi-
cantly to the oppression of women. 300
Of concern in section (f), indeed throughout CEDAW, is the
phrase "all appropriate measures." Rebecca Cook contends the
phrase establishes "an obligation to act in accordance with in-
ternational standards of performance."301 However, it also al-
lows "[tihe determination... [to] be sensitive to national legal,
political and social environments, "302 "All appropriate
298 WzTZEL, supra note 51, at 93.
299 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(f).
300 Southard, supra note 19, passim.
301 Cook, State Responsibility of Violations of Women's Human Rights, supra
note 147, at 161.
302 Cook, State Responsibility of Violations of Women's Human Rights, supra
note 147, at 161.
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measures" is problematic because of the absence of women,
which may be inherent in the decision making process. A deci-
sion maker must be able to recognize that an existing custom or
practice is detrimental to women's human rights. However,
even this step may be difficult for a member of the dominant
group to comprehend.
One noted human rights scholar presents arguments for
"preserv[ing] the tension between, and the insights of, both rel-
ativism and universalism."30 3 While noting that "appeals to
traditional practices and values all too often are a mere cloak
for self interest or arbitrary rule,"30 4 he asserts that if a cultural
practice has an "underlying cultural vision of human nature or
society [that] is both morally defensible and incompatible with
the implementation of the 'universal' human right in ques-
tion,"30 5 then it may be perfectly acceptable under international
human rights law. To a strict universalist, it might appear to be
in violation. As an example, this article includes a brief analy-
sis of brideprice.A0 6 Although this analysis of dowry is very
brief, it concludes that the "underlying cultural vision" of the
practice of dowry payments is "morally defensible" and incom-
patible with universal norms. The analysis of dowry begins
with article 16 of the Universal Declaration 307 which guaran-
tees women and men the right to enter into marriage only with
their "free and full consent."30 8 The author contends that this
right is more open to interpretation than other rights, because
it "reflects a specific cultural interpretation of marriage... that
is of relatively recent origin and by no means universal to-
day.... " 3o 9 His analysis does not reflect an underlying interna-
tional concern for the rights of women, but rather views article
303 Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM.
RTs. Q. 400, 400 (1984).
304 Id. at 412.
305 Id. at 417.
306 Donnelly's use of the word "brideprice" is unclear. Traditionally, brideprice
was an amount of money paid by the groom's family to the bride's. Since this prac-
tice has died out virtually everywhere and since many authors seem to use the
words "dowry" and "brideprice" interchangeably, I am assuming that Donnelly is
referring to the payment of dowry, i.e., an amount paid by the bride's family to the
groom's. See, e.g., M kKcii JHA, DIMENSIONS OF INDIAN CIVILIZATION 83 (1979).
307 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, at art. 16.
308 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 12, at art. 16(2).
309 Donnelly, supra note 303, at 418.
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16 as an attempt to standardize marriage traditions. It also ig-
nores the fact that "specific cultural interpretation[s]" are ex-
actly the means usually used to oppress women in a given
society. In addition, rights that are of recent origin and not uni-
versal are not usually, for those reasons, considered less worthy
of international promotion.3 10
The article goes on to contend that "some traditional cus-
toms, such as brideprice, provide alternative protections for wo-
men.. . that address at least some of the underlying concerns of
article 16(2)."3-1 This seems to acknowledge that issues of wo-
men's human rights underlie article 16, although the author
characterizes them as protection for women, not equality of men
and women. However, if women need protection in the decision
to marry (and currently, they often do), they need protection
from the dowry system itself. Women are dying when their
families cannot provide adequate dowries. 31 2 Yet, dowry helps
maintain a system whereby marriage is the only viable alterna-
tive for a woman.313 In addition, the stated human rights goal
of CEDAW is to enable women to achieve equality with men, not
to merely be protected from the abuses of a patriarchal system,
while allowing the gender hierarchy to continue.
This analysis would allow decision-makers within a society
to maintain the dowry system, because it is "sensitive to na-
tional legal, political and social environments."3 1 4 However, the
analysis is flawed because of where the author stands while he
views the issue of dowry. The ingrained beliefs of society lead
most of us to accept, without questioning or even particularly
310 See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, In Nairobi, Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1985
at A6. ("Ten years ago the idea that women should be singled out as an interest
group with a separate collection of issues baffled much of the world.") In addition,
marriage has been dealt with by the universal human rights community since the
beginning of the modem human rights era; it is questionable, therefore, how "re-
cent" these views are. See, supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. Donnelly
himself is relying on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which is, next to
the U.N. Charter itself, one of the oldest of the modem human rights documents.
311 Donnelly, supra note 303, at 418.
312 'Dowry Deaths' Rising in India, supra note 132 ("The number of "dowry
deaths" rose to 5,582 last year from 4,836 in 1990, [the Indian government] said in
a written reply to a parliamentary question.").
313 Vijayendra Rao, How Family Planning Came to Bangladesh; India's Dowry
Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994, § 4 at 16.
314 Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human Rights, supra
note 147, at 161.
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thinking about it, that a woman needs and desires the institu-
tion of marriage; that it is a "natural" state. However, dowry,
rather than providing protection for women, has come to repre-
sent the worst possible marriage situation for a woman. Her
value is measured by the wealth of her family, by how much she
can contribute to increasing the wealth of her husband and his
family. In the dowry system, women are little more than in-
vestment opportunities that are evaluated based on their poten-
tial returns. In addition, women and girls are devalued by their
own families because of the financial drain they cause. "If we
don't give birth to girl children, we wouldn't have these
problems. What flows out of our eyes is not just tears, but
blood."315
This analysis demonstrates the problem when those high in
the gender hierarchy are charged with abolishing or revamping
current customs and practices to implement policies of equality
of women and men. Even for those lower down in the hierarchy
and more directly impacted by the detrimental aspects of a
practice it is difficult to envision a world without a practice that
has been around for generations. "The impact of culture on
human behavior is often underestimated precisely because it is
so powerful and deeply embedded in our self-identity and con-
sciousness."3 16 For those who are not harmed and may even
benefit from the practice, it is almost impossible. "Major parts
of our lives are dominated by assumptions that are based on
tradition and the notions of bygone eras which no longer hold
within them the ring of truth." 17 When viewing the position of
women in a society, as seen by both women and men, it may be
even more difficult to separate nature from imposed belief than
it is with other groups. "[D]iscrimination against women is
somehow regarded as more 'natural' and acceptable than, for
example, racial discrimination."318 Without the participation of
315 Murti, an Indian father, quoted in, Edward A. Gargan, Bangalore Journal;
For Many Brides in India, a Dowry Buys Death, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at A4.
316 Abdullahi Ahied An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defin-
ing International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS in CROSS-CULTURAL PER-
SPECTIVES 19, 23 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992).
317 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 152.
318 Charlesworth et al., supra note 44, at 69 (A conclusion based on a compari-
son of the number and content of reservations to CEDAW and reservations to the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.).
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the oppressed in reassessing cultural practices, customs will
continue to seem natural, continue to be unquestioned, and con-
tinue to be actively practiced and excused on the grounds of
culture.
Article 2(f) is modified by articles 5, 10, 11, and 16. Articles
10 and 11, dealing with education and employment, are consid-
ered elsewhere. Article 5(a) calls on State Parties to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and wo-
men, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereo-
typed roles for men and women.319
Throughout this analysis, stereotyping has been discussed in
detail as have some cultural practices that are based on "stereo-
typed roles for men and women." Recognizing customs and
practices that are based on beliefs of the inferiority of one gen-
der to another is more difficult. That many of these customs are
based on beliefs about the roles of men and women, beliefs that
may now be outdated, is relatively clear. As noted,3 20 many of
the stereotyped traits of women are often seen as highly valued
characteristics. Yet, stereotyping, coupled with a gender hier-
archy, nearly always leads to beliefs that male characteristics
are superior to female ones. Over time, this leads to the view
that not only are stereotyped female characteristics inferior, fe-
males themselves are inferior. Therefore, female genital muti-
lation, the veiling of women, the dowry system and woman
battering, among other things, are based on beliefs about inferi-
ority or superiority. "The representation of sexes is always
ranked, asymmetrical."321
In Africa, women's groups are working to eradicate female
genital mutilation, but few laws are passed, and governments
do little to protect women from this practice.322 Female genital
mutilation is aimed at suppressing female sexuality, due to the
319 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 5(a).
320 See, supra note 236 and accompanying text.
321 Cherifa Bouatta & Doria Cherifati-Merabtine, The Social Representation of
Women in Algeria's Islamist Movement, in IDENTITY POLITICS & WOMEN, supra
note 73, at 183, 199.
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belief that female sexuality is dangerous to society.323 In addi-
tion, the ability to control female sexuality gives men a greater
control over women and places women in the category of prop-
erty.324 It keeps women "tied to [their] husband[s'] wishes" 25
and maintains a patriarchal hierarchy326 which benefits most
the group that has the power to change it. Since this hierarchy
is based on gender, control of sexuality is of paramount impor-
tance to the powerful group. "The power of men as a class de-
pends on keeping men sexually inviolate and women sexually
used by men."327
Sexuality is such a defining force in all our lives that the
women who are victims of sexual oppression internalize the
dominant beliefs and acquiesce in order to survive. This pro-
duces a lack of self-respect that makes resistance almost impos-
sible.328 However, if women's stories are excluded from the
discussion totally, change becomes even more impossible. In
addition, female genital mutilation, for example, as a practice is
structured so that women, that is, mothers and grandmothers,
are often its strongest proponents. This is accomplished by
shrouding the dangers of the practice in silence329 and by the
power bestowed on women who continue the practice. In a song
sung by mothers to their daughters on the day of the daughters'
mutilation, the mothers proclaim, "[wie used to be friends, but
today I am the master, for I am a man. Look, I have the knife in
my hand, and I will operate on you."3 30 The ritual mutilation
provides a rare opportunity for a woman to be powerful.
323 LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM: HIsToRIcAL ROOTS OF A MOD-
ERN DEBATE 35 (1992) (Women were "perceived as innately more implicated in
physicality and sexuality than men. The shamefulness of sex was focused most
intensely on the shamefulness of the female body,. ").
324 Blaine Harden, Africans Keep Rite of Girls' Circumcision; Practice Causes
Pain, Infection, But Seen as Badge of Chastity, WASH. POST, July 13, 1985, at A12.
325 Women's Wound-Whose Will?, MONEYCLIPS, July 8, 1993.
326 Id.
327 Andrea Dworkin, I Want a Twenty-Four-Hour Truce, in, TRANSFORMING A
RAPE CULTURE, supra note 164, at 13, 17.
328 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,
supra note 60, at 46, 61.
329 Alice Walker, Speech at Radcliffe College, (June 5, 1992), in, WARRIOR
MARKS: FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION AND THE SEXUAL BLINDING OF WOMEN, 20,
24-25 (Alice Walker and Pratibha Parmar eds., 1993).
330 Ritual song sung at circumcision, from, A.M.I. Vergiat, MOEURS ET COU-
TUMES DES MANJAS (1937), reprinted in, WALKER & PARMAR, id. at 178.
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Female genital mutilation continues, in spite of laws
against it, supported by three powerful forces: a gender hierar-
chy so ingrained it is difficult to recognize, a male (often uncon-
scious) desire to maintain the gender hierarchy, and the
support of the victims who are granted at least occasional feel-
ings of power by the performance of the mutilation. Yet, in the
language of CEDAW, female genital mutilation clearly is a "dis-
tinction . . . made on the basis of sex which has the effect or
purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition ... by women
of human rights and fundamental freedoms." 33 1 The practice
itself is a violation of a woman's right to be free from "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment."3 32 But eradication of a cul-
tural practice is much more complicated than simply changing
discriminatory laws. In addition to legislation, education is vi-
tal to the process. Effective implementation of CEDAW necessi-
tates an understanding that "all appropriate measures" be
interpreted broadly. It should not allow for slow change be-
cause of the difficulty in changing custom, but require intensive
education programs to facilitate change, as well as aggressive
enforcement of new laws that are enacted to outlaw these cus-
tomary practices.
The problem of woman battering in the United States
points to the necessity for action that includes legislation, but
goes significantly beyond it as well, to include measures that get
at the structural basis for violence against women. When a wo-
man is battered, it represents not an isolated, aberrant inci-
dent, but an activity that is "pervasive and structural."333
331 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 1.
332 Torture Convention, supra note 143. The Convention does not define
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" distinct from torture. International law,
however, seems to consider cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as a lesser
form of torture. See, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1978).
The definition of torture includes the component of "instigation.., or... consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity." Tor-
ture Convention, id at art. 1. Often, the lack of an official actor is cited as the
reason international law does not become involved in customary practices. How-
ever, since CEDAW requires governments to change cultural practices, failure on
the part of government officials to intervene is a violation of law under CEDAW;
therefore, inaction is at least "acquiescence of a public official." So, if a practice fits
the rest of the definition of torture, a government that refuses to intervene is in
violation of CEDAW and, therefore, the Torture Convention.
333 Cook, Gaining Redress Within a Human Rights Framework, in OuRs By
RIGr supra note 20, at 13, 13.
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Violence against women is not a series of actions committed by
maladjusted individuals, but "stems, in large measure, from
[women's] inferior position."33 4 Although all of the individual
States in the United States have laws outlawing domestic vio-
lence, 33 5 other kinds of actions aimed at the problem may do
more toward re-affirming the "inferior position" of women than
changing the attitudes and structure of society to eliminate the
motivation to continue the practice. 336 For example, among the
techniques for combatting violence against women have been
programs to teach women self-defense and other precautions for
avoiding violent situations. Yet, these tactics ultimately result
in controlling the actions of women and therefore continue the
pattern of male control over women.337 Whether one avoids cer-
tain situations because of fear of actual attack or because it is
safer not to be there is merely a question of semantics; either
way, the reality of male violence against women restricts the
movement and activities of women and results in women being
effectively controlled. The situation of woman battering is very
much one where men are the actors and women are acted upon.
Education to change attitudes must be directed at the actors.
The United States experience with woman battering also
points out how legislation alone, or that which is not extensive
enough, may have little impact on a given problem. The cooper-
ation of police is vitally necessary in combatting domestic vio-
lence and enforcing the laws that a legislature passes. Yet,
traditionally in the United States; police departments have left
enforcement of domestic violence laws in the hands of victims.
Police officers need not have someone swear out a warrant to
arrest two people in a fight. Two men standing on a corner in a
fist fight; a police officer can arrest them both, regardless of
whether either one swears out a complaint. In the vast majority
of cases where a woman is bleeding from an orifice and a man is
334 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 161.
335 Lauren L. McFarlane, Domestic Violence Victims v. Municipalities: Who
Pays When Police Will Not Respond?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 929, 931 (1991).
336 Gloria Steinem, Erotica Vs. Pornography, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CuL-
TURE supra note 164, at 33, 33 ("[Ilt takes violence or the threat of it to maintain
the dominance of any group of human beings over another. Moreover, the threat
must be the most persuasive wherever men and women come together intimately
and are most in danger of recognizing each other's humanity.").
337 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 163.
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standing over her and the police are called, they turn to the wo-
man and say, "Do you wish to swear out a warrant?" And when
she stands there at 110 pounds looking at a 230 pound man,
knowing that if she says yes, then once he gets out on bail, he may
beat the living hell out of her again, they demand of her, before
they'll arrest,... in most cases - to swear out a warrant. They
don't do that with men.338
In addition to not arresting abusers, a police officer notes, "For a
long time I think police officers would respond to domestic vio-
lence calls and have the attitude of apathy, if you will, disdain,
contempt for the victim." 33 9 Nonetheless, only twenty-seven
states have laws mandating arrest for domestic violence. 340
Once the laws are enacted by the legislature and the police
begin to enforce them, prosecutors must follow through, without
relying on the victim to direct the prosecution.
Victims of domestic violence should never be asked if they want to
press charges or if they want to prosecute - never. If you create
a policy that says that you might as well draw a target on the
victim's chest, because you've just told the batterer that now the
victim has control over what happens. And if he can manipulate
her, if he can intimidate her, if he can threaten her, the case will
go away.34 1
Nonetheless, woman battering is viewed as a crime in which the
victim is responsible, responsible for her attack and responsible
for arresting and prosecuting her attacker. The policy of requir-
ing the victim to press charges and follow through on the prose-
cution of her batterer is "an age-old legal tenet,"342 albeit one
338 Confirmation of Ruth Bader Ginsburg as Supreme Court Justice, 1993:
Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 194 (1993)
(statement of Senator Joseph Biden); see also, Joint Resolution Designating Octo-
ber 1991 as "National Domestic Violence Awareness Month"; "Whereas some indi-
viduals in our law enforcement and judicial systems continue to think of spousal
abuse as a "private" matter and are hesitant to intervene and treat domestic as-
sault as a crime .... " S.J. Res. 73, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 105 Stat. 579 (1991).
339 San Diego Successfully Battles Domestic Violence (CNN television broad-
cast, June 28, 1994).
340 Turning Point: Police in 27 States Can Now Make Arrests in Cases of Do-
mestic Abuse Even if the Victim Doesn't Want to Prosecute (ABC television broad-
cast, July 20, 1994).
341 Supra note 339.
342 Bettina Boxall & Frederick M. Muir, Prosecutors Taking Harder Line To-
ward Spouse Abuse; Violence: New Legal Techniques Tested. But Critics Say At-
tacks on Women are Still not Taken Seriously Enough, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1994,
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that is slowly changing. 343 Imagine the scenario of the police
responding to an alarm at a bank, nabbing the robber as he
flees out the door, then turning to the bank president and ask-
ing, "Do you want to press charges? Do you want to prosecute?"
Even if the police arrest and the district, county and city
attorneys prosecute, the judges who hear the cases must treat
them like the crimes that they are. Some states have begun to
require that judges receive specialized training in domestic vio-
lence issues. 344 Such training is sorely needed. For example, in
1989, a battered woman appeared before a judge in Massachu-
setts, requesting protection from the man who had bragged,
even in front of police, that he was going to kill her. The judge
responded, "This court has a lot more serious matters to con-
tend with."3 45 This woman is now dead.346 A woman in Georgia
faced a judge who "mocked" her and "led the courtroom in
laughter as the woman left" when she asked for protection from
the husband who had repeatedly threatened to kill her. Her
husband appeared before this judge before, and this time, just
like the previous times, the charges were dismissed. This wo-
man is now dead.347 Included in the numerous reports of O.J.
Simpson's history as a woman batterer that have surfaced since
his arrest in the murders of Nicole Simpson and Ronald
Goldman is the report that, in 1989, when Simpson pleaded
Nolo Contendre to spouse abuse, he was sentenced to "[a] small
at Al. Sonoma County (CA) Dist. Atty. Gene Tunney expressed his office's policy
this way: "No matter how much time you spend with these ladies, many will still
not prosecute." Id. Lynda Gorov, Battering Case Fits Pattern, Some Say; Woman
Apparently Caught in Bind, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1993, at 22 ("Too often, [do-
mestic violence advocates] say, women caught in the cycle of domestic violence not
only remain with their abusers, they also refuse to prosecute them.") (emphasis
added). See also, Jane Hansen, Decision to Prosecute Batterer is the State's, AT-
LANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, Apr. 28, 1992, at Di. (The file of a battered
woman in Atlanta, described by police as "beaten to a pulp," contains the notation,
"[h]owever, the subject failed to prosecute.") Even domestic violence advocates can
fall into the legal/semantic trap.
343 Boxall & Muir, id.
344 Bob Hohler, State Judges Lag in Training on Domestic Violence Cases, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 1993, at 1.
345 Karen Tumulty & Stephanie Chavez, Domestic Abuse Laws; Victims Find
Little Safety in System, LA TIMES, Sept. 4, 1989, at 1.
346 Tumulty & Chavez, id.
347 Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women's Right to
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fine, two years' probation, counseling by phone, and 120 hours
of community service," 348 even though police had been called by
Nicole Simpson eight times before.3 49 Nicole Simpson is now
dead.350
The legal system is not alone in needing reform in order to
respond to human rights abuses impacting women. As many as
a third of women visiting hospital emergency rooms are there
because of injuries resulting from woman battering. The Amer-
ican Medical Association calls domestic violence an epidemic. 351
The medical profession is beginning to implement programs to
recognize and treat victims of domestic violence. The Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has
recommended its members develop and implement policies, pro-
cedures and educational programs identifying and treating bat-
tered patients.3 52 A family doctor, or emergency room doctor, is
often a battered woman's primary contact with the outside
world. Nonetheless, one survey showed that only 14% of doc-
tors polled felt "very capable" of identifying and treating bat-
tered women. 353 In addition to the professionals a battered
woman may encounter, she must also deal with the treatment
and attitudes of family, friends, employers and co-workers.
Modifying the "customs and practices which constitute dis-
crimination against women"354 is a large undertaking. It is un-
fortunate that the international community, via CEDAW,
provides no guidance as to who the decision makers should be
and how the decisions should be made, nor as to the kinds of
"measures" that are "appropriate." This discussion of female
genital mutilation and woman battering demonstrates that atti-
tudes toward these practices run much deeper than the legal
system. When decision makers have inherited traditions, legal
348 Judge's Leniency Kept Simpson out of Jail (CNN television broadcast, June
21, 1994).
349 Id.
350 On October 3, 1995, O.J. Simpson was found not guilty of the murder of
Nicole Simpson.
351 Laura Fraser, A Hidden Epidemic; As Many as 12 Million Women a Year
are at Risk of Being Battered, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATcH, Feb. 27, 1993, at 1D.
352 E. McLoughlin et al, Emergency Department Response to Domestic Violence
- California, 1992, 270 JAMA 1296 (Sept. 15, 1993).
353 Michele Lesie, Doctors Told to Look for Abuse, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
Oct. 29, 1993, at 9C.
354 CEDAW supra note 1, at art. 2(f).
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or societal, that are so firmly entrenched as to seem natural, re-
education must begin at the highest levels of society and must
include all levels of society. The only possibility for success in
overcoming these discriminations against women is a society
that will not tolerate activities that restructure or restrict wo-
men's sexuality or autonomy in any way. The phrase "all appro-
priate measures" is simply too ambiguous to encompass the
kinds of radical, structural changes a society must experience in
order to combat these kinds of discriminations against women.
"All the resources of a country must be channeled into making
equality a fact as well as a law."3 55
Article 5(b) has the potential either to encourage enormous
changes in any patriarchal society or to entrench motherhood in
the national mentality in a manner that will set back women's
rights by decades. This clause mandates that:
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures ... to ensure
that family education includes a proper understanding of mater-
nity as a social function and the recognition of the common re-
sponsibility of men and women in the upbringing and
development of their children, it being understood that the inter-
est of the children is the primordial consideration in all cases. 35 6
It is possible to deconstruct the language of this article so that it
either promotes women's rights or more deeply ingrains patri-
archal assumptions about women and their role as mothers.
The most problematic phrase in this section is "proper un-
derstanding." This language, depending on who is interpreting
it, could lead to an increase in the belief and practice that moth-
erhood is the only proper role for women, and that women who
do not bear children are not "real" women or "patriotic" women.
In many nationalist movements, it is through the bearing of
children - the provision of more citizens - that women receive
status. Not only does this limit women's choices by locking
them into particular, prescribed, "appropriate" roles, "[i]t is pre-
cisely because ... reproduction, and child-rearing acquire such
strategic importance with the rise of nationalism that many na-
tionalist men become newly aware of their need to exert control
355 Luke T. Lee, Law and the Status of Women; 8 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW REVIEW 3 (1976).
356 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 5(b).
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over the women."357 Therefore, controlling women becomes sy-
nonymous with directing the fate of the nation. Most often this
control is exerted with talk of patriotism and tradition. On oc-
casion, it becomes much more blatant.
In 1990, the rate of natural population growth in Croatia
was .07 percent. It was expected that by the end of the civil
war, the population would experience an actual decline. To
combat this trend, the Croatian government passed a series of
laws that were aimed at increasing the birth rate.358 These pro-
visions included a call to draft legislation "which will ensure
that the highest profession in the Republic will be that of the
mother as educator of children."359 Like CEDAW's article 5(b),
this language could work to improve women's situation, recog-
nizing the bearing and rearing of children to be deserving of re-
spect equal to the respect given to people who choose other
professions. Conversely, this provision could ensure that wo-
men are only respected when they function as reproducers, not
"merely" as producers. Subsequent provisions clarify that the
Republic of Croatia intended to follow the latter route.
Other sections of the legislation called for the "remov[al of]
working mothers with children from factories and other places
of heavy work which are unsuitable for them."360 This provision
would guarantee not only that "women-mothers" 361 would be
freed from such work, but that "thousands of workplaces in Cro-
atia would become vacant."362 It is questionable which is the
primary motivation. In addition, the legislature enacted legis-
lation aimed at "[flighting [n]on-womanhood." 363 This provision
calls for tax structures that "will not support" couples who have
only "one child or even no child at all"; rather, taxes will favor
"the family and couples with children."364 Noted to be particu-
larly "evil" in this context are "late marriages between the ages
357 CYNTHIA ENLOE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEXUAL POLITICS AT THE END OF THE
COLD WAR 238-39 (1993).
358 Id. at 241.
359 Id. at 242.
360 Id. at 242.
361 Id. at 242.
362 CYNTHIA ENLOE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEXUAL POLITICS AT THE END OF THE
COLD WAR 242 (1993).
363 Id. at 242.
364 Id. at 242.
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of 35 and 50.... ." Many women have found that the only possi-
bility for them to acquire an adequate education or establish a
meaningful career is to delay marriage. Not only does the offi-
cial policy of Croatia define the choice to have few or no children
as an "evil," this policy devalues women who have passed child
bearing age immeasurably.
It is assumed that this type of categorizing and devaluing of
women is not what the drafters of CEDAW intended; it is unfor-
tunate they did not expand on the meaning of the "proper un-
derstanding of maternity as a social function." Although
"proper" is not defined, referring to maternity as a social func-
tion indicates the intention of the drafters was that this func-
tion, which only women can perform, should be recognized for
the value it contributes to a society and not denigrated precisely
because only women can perform it. Reports from the general
debate at the Nairobi Conference on the United Nations Decade
for Women buttress this interpretation. Although the issue ap-
pears to have been addressed only sparsely in Nairobi, "[a]
number of representatives stated that in their countries moth-
erhood was recognized as an important social function." 65 The
representatives addressing this issue discussed their countries'
policies regarding maternity leave from work, day care, health
care and government assistance to mothers and children. 366
The difference between the Croatian government's view of
the social function of maternity and that expressed by repre-
sentatives to the Nairobi Conference may best be explained by
speculating about who was involved in the process that resulted
in the decisions about how a particular government was going
to understand the social function of motherhood. The Croatian
government's policy supports a patriarchal conception of the
State;367 women's role is to produce children and stay home to
365 Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of
the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace, Nairobi,
Kenya Conference at 118, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.116/28/Rev.1 (1985).
366 Id.
367 Valentine M. Moghadam, Introduction: Women and Identity Politics in
Theoretical and Comparative Perspective, in, IDENTITY POLITICS AND WOMEN, supra
note 73, at 3, 16. "Crisis and transition seem to bring about an exaggerated reli-
ance on the home and family as refuge for the assaulted identity." ENLOE, note 88,
at 53, 64 ("[A] nationalist movement informed by masculinist pride and holding a
patriarchal vision of the new nation-state is likely to produce just one more actor
in the [patriarchal] international arena.").
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educate them to be future citizens of the State. Furthermore,
by staying home, women are no longer in competition with men
for factory and other jobs involving "heavy work." The result is
not only an increase in the population, but a decrease in unem-
ployment, two indicators of the success of the government. At
the Nairobi Conference, the discussion centered on the women
who have or will have children. The policies are designed to
allow mothers who also identify themselves as outside-the-
home workers to maintain both parts of their identity. Further,
when motherhood is respected as a career choice, women who
do not participate in outside-the-home employment are also
respected for what they (re)produce. It is fairly clear that this
conception of maternity is in the nature of what was intended
by the CEDAW drafters. Unfortunately, their choice of lan-
guage does not clari this issue.
Article 16 outlines in greater detail the human rights of wo-
men in the context of marriage; several of the issues have been
discussed in other contexts.3 68 In addition to the equal rights to
enter and dissolve a marriage, article 16 discusses issues that
CEDAW deals with in other sections: equal rights and responsi-
bilities as parents, 369 which are discussed in articles 5(b), 10(h),
11(2)(b), (c) and (d), and 12, and equal personal rights,370 which
are discussed in articles 9, 11(1)(c), 13, 14(2)(g) and 15. The
greatest impact of article 16 may be to serve as a reminder that
women do not become the property of or mere extensions of the
men they marry. Previously, marriage and child-bearing were
often the only contexts in which the international community
addressed the rights of women.371 This emphasis, however, ig-
nored that "protection of the family also preserves the power
structure within the family, which can lead to subjugation and
dominance by men over women and children."372 Article 16 is
designed to recognize the oppression of women that may be in-
tegral to marriage; oppression that varies among cultures.
All of the cultural practices discussed throughout this arti-
cle relate in some way to the institution of marriage in a partic-
368 See, e.g., supra notes 47 - 51 and 312 - 314 and accompanying text.
369 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 16(d), (e) and (f).
370 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 16(g) and (h).
371 See, supra notes 47 - 51 and accompanying text.
372 Charlesworth et al., supra note 44, at 623.
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ular culture and to the belief that women are somehow a
commodity in their relationship to their husbands (or future
husbands). Dowry murders provide perhaps the most salient
example of this manifestation. However, both the veiling of wo-
men and female genital mutilation are designed to ensure wo-
men are virgins at the time of marriage and remain
monogamous after marriage. Woman battering is a particu-
larly virulent manifestation of the principle that a "man's home
is his castle." As a recognition that marriage (and the prospect
of marriage) presents women with particular forms of oppres-
sion, article 16 is grounded in feminist theory.
In the context of the universalism/relativism debate,3 73 ar-
ticle 16 superficially represents doctrine that may be seen as a
resolution of that debate. Section (a), for example, mandates
that men and women should have "[t]he same right to enter into
marriage."374 Assuming that a given culture does not violate
international law standards as to age and right to choose one's
partner, section (a) can serve to protect a variety of cultural
marriage traditions (the relativist side of the debate) while re-
quiring a universal standard of equality.
At the same time, however, article 16's detailed discussion
of marriage points out an omission in CEDAW. Nowhere does
CEDAW discuss specifically the rights of women who are not
married. This does a disservice, not only to heterosexual wo-
men who generally fit into a culture's dominant race or class but
simply choose not to marry, but most especially to lesbian and
bisexual women, for whom not marrying is more than a simple
lifestyle choice. The omission of unmarried women of all sexual
orientations highlights, again, the paternalism of both cultural
and universal standards. While it is imperative that CEDAW
functions to assure the rights of married women, doing so at the
expense of discussing marriage as one lifestyle option among
many marginalizes women who do not marry. Article 16 high-
lights the liberal bent of CEDAW, and therefore the androcen-
tric viewpoint of the document.
CEDAW begins with the assumption that the institutions
and procedures currently practiced in given societies are basi-
cally appropriate modes of behavior. All that is missing is that
373 See, supra notes 1 - 13 and accompanying text.
374 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 16(1).
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women are often denied access, or meaningful access, to these
institutions and procedures. Article 16 points up the necessity
of viewing various cultures from a new location; a location that
begins by asking "what do women and men (all women and
men) want, need and desire and how can individual govern-
ments and international law assure that people will have their
needs fulfilled?"
7. De-Criminalizing Gender - Articles 2(g), 15 & 16
Section (g) of article 2 calls for States Parties "[tlo repeal all
national penal provisions which constitute discrimination
against women."375 This article is modified by articles 15 and
16, which have been analyzed previously. Penal provisions are
those which are punishable by the State law enforcement mech-
anism.3 76 This section is targeted at criminal provisions aimed
directly at women, provisions relating to women's mode of
dress,377 or provisions providing for different standards for wo-
men and men (for example when adultery is a crime for women
but not for men). Section (g) relates also to laws that appear to
be neutral, but in reality "constitute discrimination against wo-
men." It is important to note that laws that appear to be neu-
tral, may not be. When laws are initially enacted in a setting of
gender hierarchy, but that hierarchy is ignored by an official
policy of neutrality, the gender difference seems natural and the
"harm that has been done will not be perceptible as harm."378
While dowry, female genital mutilation and woman bat-
tering are all, to greater and lesser degrees, outlawed or at least
discussed as to the possibility of being outlawed, the veil and all
it represents in Middle-Eastern cultures 379 is part of the crimi-
375 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 2(g).
376 BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1019 (5th ed. 1979).
377 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Security, International
Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sept.
29, 1993 (Statement of John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs) reprinted in, Violations of Women's Human Rights, 1993
U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch, Oct. 11, 1993, Vol. 4 No. 41.
378 Catherine MacKinnon, Francis Biddle's Sister, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,
supra note 60, at 166.
379 The veiling of women is justified by Sharia, or Muslim personal law, and is
defended by its proponents as a religious imperative. However, feminist Muslim
scholars argue that the veiling of women is a cultural imperative. See, e.g., Pamela
Bone, Jordan: An Islamic Princess Defends Her Faith, THE AGE (Melbourne), June
1996]
75
PACE INT'L L. REV.
nal and personal law of many countries. 380 National laws based
on Sharia impact women in different countries in different
ways. "[T]he specific content of the laws derivable from the
Quran depends greatly on the interpretation that legists chose
to bring to it and the elements of its complex utterances that
they chose to give weight to."38 1 For example, in Iran, Saudi
Arabia and the Sudan, women who fail to cover themselves face
criminal prosecution. In addition, in the Sudan and Saudi Ara-
bia, a woman cannot travel without the permission, in writing,
of her male guardian. If a woman in Iran is caught alone with a
man who is not a member of her family, she can be arrested. In
Kuwait, women cannot vote.38 2 In Pakistan, a woman who is
raped must provide four adult male witnesses to the attack. If a
woman has the misfortune to be raped without the necessary
witnesses present, she may be jailed for having "impermissible
sex."38 3 It is not necessarily unusual for countries, at least in
the recent past, to treat women and men differently under the
laws that pertain to sexual conduct. 384 What is unique about
Sharia is the extent to which it intrudes on women's lives as
well as the extent it is supposedly based on religion, rather than
simply culture. Religion serves both to give meaning to the eve-
ryday way things are and to "proclaim what ought to be." 38 5
Although Sharia helps fulfill important religious roles, it is im-
25, 1993. ("It has been argued that... Islam restricts the rights of women. Islam
does no such thing. In most cases the practices are relics of culture unrelated to
Islam.") See, also, Elaine Sciolino, Islam: Feminists vs. Fundamentalists, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 1985 at C1. Because of this disagreement, I prefer to analyze veil-
ing as a cultural tradition; therefore, while it is true that Muslim fundamentalists
outside of the Middle East require women to be veiled, I will refer to the practice as
a Middle-Eastern custom. Muslim author Fatima Mernissi says, "Being Muslim is
a civil matter, a national identity, a passport, a family code of laws, a code of public
rights." FATIMA MERNISSI, THE VEIL AND THE MALE ELITE 20 (Mary Jo Lakeland,
trans., 1991) (1987).
380 Deborah Scroggins, The Women of Fundamentalist Islam: Back to a World
Ruled by Men, THE OTrAWA CITIZEN, July 11, 1992 at B2.
381 AHMED, supra note 316, at 88.
382 Scroggins, supra note 380.
383 Michele Landsberg, Human Rights Must Include Woman's Right to Escape
Abuse, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 12, 1992 at G1.
384 Shahnaz Sadjadi & Marianne Hedin-Pourghasemi, Law and the Status of
Women in Iran, in, LAW AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN, supra note 355 at 141, 154.
385 Joan H. Timmerman, Religion and Violence: The Persistence of Ambiva-
lence, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE, supra note 164 at 201, 203.
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portant to remember that "[in many countries, what is consid-
ered Islamic is muddled with local customs and traditions."3 86
The underlying basis of these laws, although there is vari-
ety among Middle-Eastern countries, is that women are the
targets of regulation.3 87 The veil is representative of the treat-
ment of women in Middle-Eastern cultures - it also serves a
representative function drawing a line between "Muslim" and
the outside world.38 8 Most of all, however, compulsory veiling
represents a lack of choice of identity for Muslim women. Iden-
tity as "woman" is defined and imposed by the state in the form
of the veil. 38 9 A veiled woman is a woman who functions as one
man's daughter, one man's wife and some men's mother. The
veil functions as notice to men of the availability of a woman for
sexual purposes.3 90 And, no other choice of identity is
considered.
As availability and sexuality are considered the defining
characteristics of woman, men exert tremendous control over
women. Autonomy for women is nonexistent. 391 Men control
women's movements and demeanor completely because this is
necessary in order for men to retain control over women's sexu-
ality. Moreover, the laws that impose this control on women are
not mere vestiges of ancient legislation. A change in the law in
Algeria in 1984 deprived women of their freedom to choose a
marriage partner. Now they must depend on the counsel of a
male "matrimonial tutor."3 92 Also taken away recently was a
woman's right to divorce or to have custody of her children. The
next year, legislation in India abolished a Muslim woman's
right to alimony, in accordance with Sharia.3 93 In 1990, Ira-
386 Sciolino, supra note 379.
387 See, e.g., AHMED, supra note 316, at 6; Margot Badran, Gender Activism:
Feminists and Islamist in Egypt, in IDENTITY POLITICS & WOMEN, supra note 73, at
208; Bouatta & Cherifati-Merabtine, supra note 298, at 199; Binnaz Toprak, Wo-
men and Fundamentalism: The Case of Turkey, in IDENTITY POLITICS & WOMEN
supra note 73, at 293, 293; Louise Crosby, Islamic Apartheid: Conference Told Rise
of Fundamentalism Forces More Women to Obey Restrictive Codes, THE OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Sept. 4, 1992, at A6.
388 Moghadam, supra note 367, at 14.
389 Moghadam, supra note 367, at 14.
390 AHMED, supra note 316, at 15.
391 AHMED, supra note 316, at 62.
392 See, Crosby, supra note 387.
393 See, Crosby, supra note 387.
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nian men gained the right to kill women family members sus-
pected of adultery.394 Recently, a progressive family law
enacted in Egypt in 1979 was overturned by Muslim fundamen-
talists on procedural grounds: polygamy is once again legal, a
man may once again legally prevent his wife from working or
travelling and it is once again easier for a man to obtain a di-
vorce than for a woman.395
The Koran is being used by fundamentalists to deny the
rights of women. Many argue that these restrictions are not re-
quired by the Koran.396 The motivation is not religious, but pa-
triarchal. These restrictions ensure the domination of women
by men, cloaked in a religious cover so that even women believe
in the religious imperative of the laws. "Men play upon the reli-
gious sentiment of the people, and the people believe it is Islam
when it's a custom or a tradition."3 97
Anti-woman laws based on Sharia are relatively easy for
anyone to recognize. As with other issues pertaining to
CEDAW, however, other penal provisions that discriminate
against women may be more difficult to spot, particularly if wo-
men are not included in the discussions of how to reform penal
provisions. An example is found in the domestic violence laws
of the United States. In the United States, criminal law relat-
ing to woman battering is largely a function of state law,398 so
there is some variety among the laws.3 99 Domestic violence was
394 See, Crosby, supra note 387.
395 See, Sciolino, supra note 379.
396 See, Scroggins, supra note 380.
397 Sciolino, supra note 379.
398 The Violence Against Women Act has been introduced in the last several
Congresses; recently it's passage was spearheaded by Senator Joseph Biden. It
includes provisions allowing civil rights causes of action for hate crimes based on
gender, makes crossing state lines to inflict spousal abuse a federal offense and
encourages all states and localities to adopt a mandatory arrest policy. The Act
passed as part of the Crime Bill passed by the Senate on August 25, 1994, cur-
rently awaiting President Clinton's signature. Abused Women are Crime-Bill Win-
ners, DES MoINEs REGISTER, Aug 27, 1994 at 1.
399 Pennsylvania passed the first domestic violence law in 1976. Now, all
states have specific domestic violence provisions. Renewed Concern Sparks Aware-
ness of Domestic Violence, (National Public Radio Morning Edition broadcast, June
23, 1994); examples of the variety among state laws includes: 15 states have
mandatory arrest laws, World News Tonight: State Domestic Violence Laws (ABC
Television Broadcast, June 20, 1994); several state court systems treat domestic
violence as a civil, not a criminal matter, Lynne Gold-Bikin, Larry King Live: Bob
Costas on the O.J. Simpson Tragedy (CNN Television Broadcast, June 20,1994); in
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first criminalized by a state in 1976.400 Prior to that time, wo-
man battering was routinely ignored by law enforcement. 40 1
What is astounding is that separate legislation was necessary
at all. When a person "causes bodily injury to another,"40 2 it
was assault then as it is now. If the victim was not related to
the perpetrator and the assault happened anywhere but the
home, chances were the perpetrator would be arrested. If the
victim was the perpetrator's wife or girlfriend, it would be sug-
gested to the perpetrator that he walk around the block and
calm down. If the police even spoke to the woman (assuming
she was not "hysterical"), it was to give her advice on how to
keep from making her husband angry so she could avoid further
injury. Absolutely the only difference in the two assaults was
the relationship of the victim to the perpetrator.
It was therefore necessary to legislate against spousal
abuse, since it was not being treated like any other assault.
However, once the legislation was in place, the police, the prose-
cutors and the judges did not change their behavior at all. The
pre-protective legislation days represent how women are dis-
criminated against by unequal application of the laws. Current
legislation has not solved the problems of arrest and enforce-
ment, proving a change in legislation may not be enough. Wo-
men are discriminated against if there are no laws aimed
directly at spousal abuse because, in that situation, an assault
is not an assault. And, the discrimination continues when pro-
tective legislation is enacted. Unfortunately, CEDAW only calls
for a repeal of discriminatory provisions; there is no specific call
to enact penal laws that may be necessary to protect women's
rights.
over half the U.S. states, a man is immune from prosecution, in some situations,
for raping his wife; in seven states, interspousal immunity prevents a woman from
suing her husband to pay the medical bills from injuries he inflicted, Civil & Con-
stitutional Rights: Violence Motivated by Gender, 1993: Hearings on H.R. 1133
Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 103rd. Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993) (Testimony of Sally Goldfarb
Senior Staff Attorney Legal Defense & Educational Fund).
400 Renewed Concern Sparks Awareness of Domestic Violence (National Public
Radio Broadcast, June 23, 1994).
401 See, e.g., Michele Ingrassia & Melinda Beck, Patterns of Abuse, NEWSWEEK
July 4, 1994 at 26, 31-32.
402 MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1962).
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8. The Full Development and Advancement of Women -
Article 3
Articles 3, 4 and 14 of CEDAW, although they amplify parts
of article 2, also stand alone in creating specific guarantees for
women. Article 3 of CEDAW requires States Parties to
take in all fields, in particular in the political, social, economic
and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, including legisla-
tion, to ensure the full development and advancement of women,
for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment
of human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality
with men.40 3
On one level, this provision is very broad. "Political" encom-
passes activities from voting and holding office to freedom of
speech and assembly. "Economic" ranges from salary issues to
aid and development issues. "Cultural" issues have been dis-
cussed throughout and are wide-ranging indeed. And "social"
may be the broadest of all. Social interactions are interactions
"of or having to do with human beings living together as a group
in a situation requiring that they have dealings with one an-
other."40 4 These four fields encompass virtually all forms of
human interaction.
Article 3 is limited, however, by its purpose, which is to as-
sure women "the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men."40 5 The
first limitation this creates is in the determination of which
rights and freedoms are fundamental. The international com-
munity is not necessarily in accord on the question of the extent
and definition, indeed even the inclusion of certain rights, of
fundamental rights and freedoms. 40 6 In addition, article 3 calls
for women's access to human rights and fundamental freedoms
to be on "a basis of equality with men." This, once again, cre-
ates a situation where the needs and desires of women must be
defined in a manner that will fit into an androcentric definition
of human rights. To a battered woman, her beatings constitute
torture, an "act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
403 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 3.
404 WEBSTER'S NEw UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1722 (2d ed. 1983).
405 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 3.
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physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as... intimidating or coercing him [sic] or a third
person... when such pain or suffering is inflicted... with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official."40 7 She suffers phys-
ical or emotional pain or suffering that is inflicted intentionally
for the purpose of coercing her into behaving the way the bat-
terer wants her to behave. In addition, when police, prosecutors
and judges refuse to arrest and prosecute or treat the assault as
a lesser crime because they devalue the victim, the assault
takes place with the consent of the government. 408 Yet, we con-
tinue to "condemn states which torture political prisoners with-
out condemning those who condone domestic violence by failing
to prosecute offenders."409 Article 3 does not recognize that
"human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality
with men" may not provide women meaningful equality. It does
not consider that these rights are based on an androcentric view
of what is fundamental.
9. De Facto Equality - Article 4
Article 4 allows States Parties to implement "special meas-
ures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and
women."410 Commonly known as affirmative action, these
measures are "fundamental to overcoming the barriers that
have closed off women throughout the world from full participa-
tion in society."4 1' Throughout CEDAW, States Parties are
called on to eliminate discrimination against women via "all ap-
propriate measures, including legislation." Although affirma-
tive action programs may be mandated by legislation, they are
also a different kind of "appropriate measure" that serves an
educational function. The more one sees, for example, women
police officers, the less unthinkable it becomes, the less obvious
407 Torture Convention, supra note 143, at art. 1.
408 ANN JONES, NExT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATTERING AND How TO STOP IT
88 (1994). (A counseling program in Boston for men who batter, defines spousal
abuse as: 'any act that causes the victim to do something she does not want to do,
prevents her from doing something she wants to do, or causes her to be afraid.' In
addition, 'violence need not involve physical contact with the victim', as psychologi-
cal abuse and intimidating acts can accomplish the same coercion.) See also, Cul-
liton, supra note 347, passim.
409 Broadbent, Getting Rid of Male Bias, supra note 65, at 11.
410 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 4(1).
411 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 22.
1996]
81
PACE INT'L L. REV.
it is that law enforcers are policemen. After some time, women
become commonplace in positions that were previously open
only to men. Society, employers, educators, women and men
find that options become greater. And, if affirmative action is
sincerely implemented, as article 4(1) recognizes, after awhile it
is no longer necessary.4 12
In spite of the importance of affirmative action, article 4
limits the possibilities for the implementation of meaningful af-
firmative action by noting that it "shall in no way entail as a
consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate stan-
dards."413 As this analysis has shown, not only have women
been the victims of separate standards throughout history, but
the standards present in virtually any given situation are stan-
dards conceived by men for men. In addition, in some situa-
tions, biology dictates some difference in the standards to be
applied to men and women. Article 4(2) addresses this issue by
mandating that "special measures aimed at protecting mater-
nity shall not be considered discriminatory."41 4 This does not
allow, however, for special measures that level the playing field
between men and women, when the women are, for example,
mothers primarily responsible for child care.
It is absolutely imperative that a State committed to the
principles of equality and equity of women and men engage in a
wide range of programs to overcome systemic discrimination.
As analysis of the various substantive provisions of CEDAW
shows, women suffer oppression as a result of patriarchal gov-
ernments and social orders. It is not enough for a woman to be
treated in a non-discriminatory fashion by the public institu-
tions with which she comes in contact, but the men in her per-
sonal life must also be educated about the oppressions they visit
upon the women with whom they interact. A society committed
to removing the oppression of women will not tolerate the father
who denies his daughter the education he provides for his son or
412 Two or three decades ago, I am told, when women were barely visible in
U.S. law schools, law professors used to hold "Ladies Day" - the day when the
professor called on the women students. Now that women make up almost half of
the students in most U.S. law schools (due to affirmative action programs) such
demeaning attention to the needs of women students would probably not be
tolerated.
413 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 4(1).
414 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 4(2).
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a daughter that is undernourished because her brother receives
preference when scarce food is distributed. A country striving
to overcome the oppression of women will not only listen to wo-
men when they speak, but will ask women what they want and
need and will take the answers to heart. The equality of women
needs to be included in every item on every agenda in every
country to assure that equality is not "delayed" in favor of other
demands on government resources. Every program that every
government enacts has the potential to impact women. The
rights of women must be viewed as both a separate issue and as
integral to every decision a government makes. Failure to act
in this fashion will serve to perpetuate de facto discrimination.
10. Addressing Systemic Inequality - Article 14
Unlike the preceding substantive articles of CEDAW, arti-
cle 14, aimed at the "particular problems faced by rural wo-
men,"415 provides an example of the type of visionary approach
needed in addressing the systemic inequities facing women.
"This article is unique as a statement of human rights because
it emphasizes the rights of a particular sub-group to which spe-
cial attention should be paid."416 Currently, rural women who
do not own property are often denied development aid, whether
from foreign or domestic sources. Development programs are
most often aimed at those who own land (usually men) and, in
addition, are based on stereotypes about land ownership; for ex-
ample that a family farm is owned by, and the family headed
by, the husband.417 Often, production activities that are per-
formed by women are addressed in aid programs aimed at men,
because of the assumption that the man is the true owner of the
family's land or at least has control over the land.418 A lack of
415 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(1).
416 Freeman, supra note 204, at 98.
417 Freeman, supra note 204, at 98.
415 Ann Whitehead & Helen Bloom, Agriculture, in, GENDER AND DEVELOP-
MENT: A PRAcTIcAL GUIDE 41, 53 (Lise Ostergaard ed., 1992) ("For example, an
attempt to introduce irrigated rice production in The Gambia made an initial as-
sumption that the men were the traditional rice growers and had full control over
the resources required for it. In reality women grew the rice for household con-
sumption and exchange.... Backed by project officials, the men established exclu-
sive rights to the women's rice fields and pushed the female rice farmers out to
inferior scattered plots to continue cultivating traditional rice varieties. The levels
of improved rice production were disappointingly low,...-).
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access to aid in a developing country will further disadvantage
women in the economic arena.
This article calls on States Parties to assure that women
"participate in and benefit from rural development."419 This
participation is vital to the effective use of development aid. In-
cluding women both as participants and beneficiaries, this arti-
cle comes closest to addressing many of the short-comings
inherent in other sections of CEDAW, by embracing both
method and outcome. Women are not only to specifically benefit
from development aid, but are to be involved in making deter-
minations about aid expenditures and distributions. In addi-
tion, the subsections of section 14(2) are more extensive and
explicit than similar sections of CEDAW. These subsections call
for the involvement of women in "elaboration and implementa-
tion of development planning at all levels."420 They also man-
date access to "health care facilities, including information,
counselling and services in family planning."421 Women are to
"benefit from social security programmes,"422 and to receive ed-
ucation and training aimed at increasing their "technical profi-
ciency." This is to include formal and informal training with an
aim to assuring women will benefit from "all community and
extension services," as well as addressing functional illiter-
acy. 423 Article 14 ensures rural women the right "to organize
self-help groups and co-operatives,"424 to "participate in all com-
munity activities,"425 to "have access" to credit and loan pro-
grams, to "marketing facilities," and to receive "equal treatment
in land and agrarian reform.. . [and] resettlement schemes."426
Article 14 also addresses women's needs in the area of "ade-
quate living conditions," especially "housing, sanitation, elec-
tricity and water supply, transport and communication."
427
Finally, article 14 mandates a recognition of "non-monetized
419 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(2).
420 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(2)(a).
421 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(2)(b).
422 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(2)(c).
423 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(2)(d).
424 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(2)(e).
425 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(2)(f).
426 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(2)(g).
427 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(2)(h).
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sectors of the economy,"428 the sectors where a majority of wo-
men's labor is performed.
This attention to detail when it comes to rural women is
long overdue, as well as impressive. Other articles of CEDAW
would have benefitted by the same extensive analysis. For ex-
ample, article 15(2) which "give[s] women equal rights . . . to
administer property"429 could have include details about wo-
men's right to inherit property, to act as administratrors for the
property left to their children and to dispose of their property in
any manner they see fit. It could have mandated government
social programs aimed at helping women acquire property and
assured them equity in obtaining mortgages. It could have en-
couraged and assisted women in forming co-operatives for the
purpose of owning and administering land, and offered educa-
tional programs and training to give women the skills necessary
to effectively administer their land. In addition to guaranteeing
women equal treatment "in all stages of procedure in courts and
tribunals,430 article 15 could have provided for training for wo-
men in accessing and using the legal system, as well as training
for members of the legal profession in the special issues relating
to women and (in this example) land administration. In addi-
tion, article 15 could (and should) have mandated the inclusion
of women at all levels of this decision-making process; in deter-
mining the areas in which women (and others) need training, in
implementing the programs, in determining the kinds of gov-
ernmental aid women need to facilitate effective administration
of their property and so on. A government whose policy incor-
porates this attention to the rights of an oppressed group in all
areas of life would go far in ending the systemic discrimination
against women. This government would recognize that policies
made by the power elite do not impact only people "like" those
elite decision-makers. Every policy considered by this hypo-
thetical egalitarian government would be analyzed in a manner
that includes the input of all groups in the society, so that a
realistic assessment of the impact of the policy can be made. In
this way, the power elite itself begins to look different, as over
time it becomes more reflective of the make-up of the society.
428 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 14(1).
429 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 15(2).
430 CEDAW, supra note 1, at art. 15 (2).
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IV. APPRAisAL AND RECOMMENDATION
This analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women calls into question the
ability of both universalism and liberalism to respond ade-
quately to alleged violations of women's human rights. Cur-
rently, universalism provides an androcentric conception of
human rights that often does not encompass the real-life exper-
iences of women. This study has shown that current under-
standings of human rights norms spring from male experiences
and male understandings of the world. Women experiencing fe-
male genital mutilation, the purdah represented by the veil, the
inequities of the dowry system, and violence in their intimate
relationships understand that human rights must be expanded
to encompass the parts of the world that are traditionally seen
to be private and beyond the reach of the legal system.
Historically, international human rights law, in the liberal
tradition, perpetuated a split between the public and the pri-
vate, with law reaching only minimally into the realm of the
private. In addition, the public/private split included a sociali-
zation of women and men that assigned women's lives to the
private area. The result was that legal systems have been inef-
fective in promoting and protecting women's rights. This split
was replicated in the international human rights regime, with
its protection of the family from legal intervention and its con-
tinued assignment of women to the realm of child-bearing and
child-rearing. The United Nations continues in an androcentric
fashion, unable to meet its own goals for the inclusion of women
in decision-making positions. Nonetheless, the U.N. promul-
gated CEDAW and ensured its position as opinio juris in cus-
tomary international law.
A feminist analysis of CEDAW uncovers its androcentric
base. For the most part, CEDAW does not address the content
of human rights norms, but guarantees women the same rights
that are available to men, although the social positions of wo-
men mandate new ways of viewing human rights. In addition,
CEDAW calls for women and men to have equal access to these
rights, although the reality of women's lives is significantly dif-
ferent than men's. Finally, with few exceptions, CEDAW does
not address the issue of who is to be involved in the decision-
[Vol. 8:1
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making process in defining rights and assuring access to the
rights.
This section-by-section analysis of CEDAW is somewhat
misleading, in that treaties should be interpreted "in accord-
ance with the ordinary meaning... [of] the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."43 '
While some of the foregoing analysis would change when the
terms are taken in context and with an understanding of the
overall purpose of the Convention, the analysis nonetheless
highlights the underlying androcentrism on which CEDAW
rests.
Changes in the laws and other public and private institu-
tions are vitally necessary in achieving protection of women's
human rights. When women's issues are ignored by the law,
their "absence devalues women and their functions: women sim-
ply are not sufficiently important to merit legal regulation."43 2
Indeed, "[1]imitations on the rights of women cannot be ade-
quately challenged without due process and equality of access
and resources .... But laws that are not founded on reality are
more likely to be abusive."433 In many cases, reality may be
more serious than simply the fact that women's viewpoints are
not heard and considered. "It is worrying when those charged
with the protection of rights of others are themselves the viola-
tors of those rights."434 With no mandate to include women in
the process of implementing CEDAW, the decision-makers in
the States Parties to CEDAW will most likely continue to think
about women in the same old ways. Change will definitely not
be effective if women are not included in the formulation of
change and if patriarchy is not understood and considered as
the basis for anti-woman practices. "The only way for the truth
to surface is if less false visions come to the forefront of com-
mon-sense knowledge." 435
431 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 79, at art. 31(1).
432 Nadine Taub and Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the
Role of Law, in FEMINIST LEGAL Theory: FOUNDATIONS 9, 13 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed.,
1993).
433 WETZEL, supra note 51, at 152.
434 Africa - Women: Up in Arms over Gender Violence, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Nov. 25, 1993.
435 CHRISTINE SYLVESTER, FEMINIST THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN
A POSTMODERN ERA 46 (1994). Sylvester goes on to note, "[feminist standpoint]
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This feminist analysis of CEDAW indicates that universal-
ism, as practiced, is not able to protect women's fundamental
rights. It also points to the failings of liberalism in promoting
and protecting women's human rights. However, it is impor-
tant to note that this analysis focuses on universalism more as
practiced and less as theory. It is largely because of the inter-
section of universalism and liberalism that universalism fails to
protect women's human rights. Liberalism, and, therefore, uni-
versalism, promotes access for women to androcentric human
rights that are incapable of addressing patriarchal oppression.
However, it is possible to pay attention to the needs and
desires of all segments of a given society, even when universal
principles are applied. Ann Scales calls this "concrete univer-
sality."436 This concrete universality eliminates the "two legal
choices" available in the past; that is, "law could either ignore
differences [universalism], thereby risking needless conformity,
or it could freeze differences [relativism], thereby creating a
menu of justifications for inequality.437 But there is a third
choice, whereby we discuss, understand and celebrate the dif-
ferences that make up our societies. The legal questions then
become occasions of "discern[ing] between occasions of respect
and occasions of oppression."438 This would be accomplished
most effectively when the oppressed become the decision-mak-
ers and implementors of the changes necessary in overcoming
their oppression.
Feminist thinking adds a vital element to the process of
drawing lines between respect and oppression. And that is
the belief that women initially, strategically, and perhaps perma-
nently need space to define oppression for themselves and to for-
mulate emancipatory strategies in solidarity with other women
(and perhaps with other oppressed peoples). This politics coun-
ters the solidarity of oppressors, who inscribe women's bodies as
places of male control and who script women's assignments in
ways that rehearse gender relations of inequality, with a collec-
draws attention to the incompleteness and failure of objectivity in any project that
purports to be generalizable while giving voice and agency only to a privileged
few. ... " Id. at 48.
436 Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay in FEM-
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tive effort to seek out and root up the core of transgressions on
woman that goes by the name of patriarchy.43 9
This method of recognizing respect and recognizing oppres-
sion is applicable to any oppressed group. Understanding that
every group has a viewpoint based on their position in society, it
is highly problematic to assume that those at the top looking
down are able to view the landscape in the same way as it is
seen from lower positions. Oppression appears different to
those who are experiencing it than it does to those who are look-
ing through the filter of their own privilege. Indeed, the dam-
age done by denial of participation in decision making is clearly
so pervasive and easily masked as to raise questions about par-
ticipation itself as a fundamental right.
Exclusion from the rights-forming process is itself a denial of
human rights, and is at best likely to produce unsatisfactory sub-
stantive results. The observation here is structural; to the extent
that the international law of human rights is an exclusive result
of the states system, it cannot hope to take account of the values
and needs of peoples that are not adequately represented in that
system or even constituted to qualify for membership.
440
Women in all cultures need to have their voices heard and their
views of their cultures recognized and taken seriously. In this
way, universal standards can be made truly universal by being
defined in a way that encompasses all the members of society.
When women choose, for example, to dress in a particular way
that reflects their cultural and national heritage, while at the
same time having complete and autonomous access to all as-
pects of their society, cultural differences are celebrated while
fundamental rights are protected. In short, it is not the wear-
ing of the veil that makes a Middle-Eastern woman oppressed,
it is her lack of choice as to career, education, and marriage; her
inability to move about freely; the denial of her right to practice
her religion that causes her oppression. When all segments of
society are included in the decision-making process, especially
when the decision impacts them directly, universal standards
439 SYLVESTER, supra note 435, at 50.
440 Richard Falk, Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of
Human Rights, in, HuMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note
316, at 44, 48.
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can be promoted, while at the same time protecting cultural dif-
ferences. When differences are promoted with the purpose of
celebrating diversity rather than maintaining oppression, uni-
versal standards can be protected in a respectful and non-op-
pressive fashion.
90http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol8/iss1/1
